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ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE IN CORPORATE 
SECURITIES REPORTING 
John Oliver Cunningham* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For many years it was a common practice for barges to dump 
industrial acids, dredge spoils, and other wastes into the Atlantic 
Ocean just twelve miles south of Long Island and twelve miles 
east of the New Jersey coast. In March of 1970 a report was made 
on this dumping area by a team of scientists. The report stated 
that there was no life of any kind at the core of the dumping area, 
that this "dead sea" was almost twenty square miles in area, that 
the area appeared as a "black ooze" in a blue sea when viewed 
from the air, and that it would take anywhere from ten to one 
hundred years for the ocean currents to break up this dead sea. 1 
The effects of this ecological disaster were not just limited to the 
immediate area. There were secondary effects on the atmosphere, 
the surrounding water and the food chain, with a resulting impact 
on our health and economy.1 Although many large corporations or 
* Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW 
1 w. JOHNSON, L. DELANNEY, T. COLE & A. BROOKS, BIOLOGY 874-75 (4th ed. 1972) 
[hereinafter cited as BIOLOGY]. 
• Over two-thirds of the planet's oxygen is produced by ocean algae and plankton. 
These and other marine life forms were affected by the "dead sea." Also, some chemical 
wastes were undoubtedly ingested by larger fish at the apex of the food chain. This kind of 
"food poisoning" was responsible for the many people killed, palsied and blinded in a 
Japanese village a few decades ago (Minamata Bay Disease). Undoubtedly, some of the 
pollution also reached bathing water on the beaches, making it unhealthy to enjoy water 
recreation. The pollution depleted the oxygen content of the sea, as well as its oxygen 
producing capacity, making the area incapable of supporting life. The consequential eco-
nomic costs to commercial fisherman and others can not be known, but they were surely 
significant. See BIOLOGY, supra note 1, at 871, 874-75. 
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their subsidiaries had undoubtedly contributed to this pollution, 
these companies had no obligation to disclose their part in this 
pollution to their shareholders and prospective shareholders 
under securities law, even though shareholders are the theoretical 
"owners" of a corporation. Today, a decade after the report, envi-
ronmental law has made great strides toward stopping this kind 
of activity; but under securities law, shareholders and prospective 
shareholders still have no right to know of this kind of corporate 
pollution.3 
The limited obligations of corporations to make environmental 
disclosures to stockholders and prospective stockholders were 
challenged in the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia in 1974 by the Natural Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC),4 a public interest organization that attempts to prevent 
the continued degradation of the environment through media 
campaigns, lobbying, educational efforts and litigation.& Arguing 
that a federal environmental law affected the federal securities 
laws, the NRDC challenged a decision of the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) not to adopt several NRDC proposals for 
broadening the scope of corporate environmental disclosure re-
quirements.s The District Court twice remanded the issue to the 
agency after finding that the SEC had failed to fully consider 
adopting new environmental disclosure rules that would comply 
with the letter and spirit of federal environmental law.7 Finally, 
in April of 1979, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia upheld the agency's refusal to promulgate new 
disclosure requirements;8 in so doing, the court temporarily stifled 
• Even under existing securities laws, this corporate pollution would be "material," and 
thus subject to disclosure to shareholders, only if it was the subject of administrative or 
judicial prosecution. See Securities Release No. 5386, 38 Fed. Reg. 12, 101-0:! (1973). Un-
fortunately, only an exceedingly small portion of the country's pollution - whether legal or 
illegal - ever becomes the subject of litigation. Thus, pollution by corporations is rarely 
disclosed. See statement by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) based on its 
experience as an educational and litigational group attempting to protect the 4mvironment, 
NRDC Brief at 46, NRDC v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190 (1977). 
• NRDC v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974). 
• Court's description of ~RDC in NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
• The specific NRDC proposals are outlined in the Appendix to Stevenson, The SEC 
and the New Disclosure, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 50 (1976). 
7 NRDC v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 693 (D.D.C. 1974); NRDC v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190, 
1208-09 (D.D.C. 1977). 
8 NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1062 (D.C.Cir. 1979) (reversing NRDC v. SEC, 432 F. 
Supp. 1190 (D.D.C. 1977». 
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judicial recognition of corporate responsibility for environmental 
disclosure to shareholders and investors. This decision by the 
Court of Appeals halted a possible expansion of an important en-
vironmental law, the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA),9 into the territory of agencies having little or no direct 
environmental impact,10 and it represents a narrow judicial view 
of the function and effectiveness of disclosure in securities law. 
This article will discuss the applicable law at the root of the 
controversy and the history of NRDC v. SEC. The article will also 
offer an analysis of the case and the implications of the decision, 
as well as a look at the potential for corporate environmental 
disclosure. 
II. THE APPLICABLE LAW 
Three statutory areas underlie the NRDC v. SEC controversy. 
While the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) derives its au-
thority and responsibility from the Securities Act of 193311 and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,12 the NRDC argued that the 
duty of the SEC was modified by the mandates of the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969.13 They argued further that the 
rights of the parties in SEC rulemaking and the scope of judicial 
review over SEC actions were governed by the body of adminis-
trative law surrounding the Administrative Procedure Act. 14 
A. Securities Law 
The regulation of the selling and trading of securitiesl& became 
• 42 U.S.c. §§ 4321-4361 (1976). 
,. Disclosure under NEPA has basically been limited to disclosure of the environmental 
impact of proposed "major federal actions" through environmental impact statements. 
The NRDC proposal was unique in its request that the agency seek disclosure of the envi-
ronmental impacts of private activity not licensed or authorized by the agency. 
11 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976) . 
.. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976) . 
.. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976). See NRDC v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 695 (D.D.C. 
1974) . 
.. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, and §§ 701-706 (1976) . 
.. "Security" is defined in § 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 which provides; 
(1) the term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing 
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, trans-
ferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a 
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, 
an interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of inter-
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a matter of national interest when fully half of the fifty billion 
new securities sold in the United States between World War I 
and 1930 proved to be worthless by 1933.16 This collapse in value 
resulted in large part from abuses in issuing and trading securi-
ties. For example, sellers of securities had deliberately overstimu-
lated the demands of buyers in order to float a mass of essentially 
worthless stocks and bonds. I7 Promises of easy wealth were made 
to the buyers without disclosing to investors any of the facts es-
sential to estimating the real worth of the securities. IS The invest-
ment literature offered to the public was often misleading and 
illusory. IS 
In order to prevent harmful manipulation of securities markets 
and the sale of worthless investments by those seeking personal 
gain, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934.20 These acts were designed to require 
securities issuers to make full and fair disclosure of corporate in-
formation to the investing public.21 According to President 
Roosevelt, Congress sought in these acts "a return to a clearer 
understanding of the ancient truth that those who manage banks, 
corporations, and other agencies handling or using other people's 
money are trustees acting for others."22 The Securities Acts were 
an attempt to rebuild investor confidence in the market, to create 
est or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or 
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing. 
15 u.s.c. § 77b(l) (1976). 
,. See FEDERAL SUPERVISION OF TRAFFIC IN INVESTMENT SECURITIES IN INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933). 
17 [d. at 2. 
1. [d . 
.. [d. at 3. 
I. The Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 1,48 Stat. 74 (1933) (current version at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77a-77bbbb (1976»; The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 44, § I, 48 Stat. 881 
(1934) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976)). The purpose of the 1933 Act is 
"[tlo provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and 
foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for 
other purposes." Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (Preface to Act). The 1933 Act deals with the 
distribution of new securities for sale. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976). The 1934 Act deals with 
regulation of securities trading. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1976). After the 1964 amendments to 
the acts, the SEC regulations applied to issuers having securities listed and traded on an 
exchange, and to all issuers with 500 holders of record of a class of equity securities plus at 
least one million dollars in assets. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d, 78I(g)(I), 78w(a) (1976); Cohen, 
"Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1340, 1340-41 (1966). 
" R. SHIELDS & E. THOMAS, FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT HANDBOOK 13 (4th ed. 1977) . 
.. President Roosevelt's Message to Congress (March 29, 1933), 77 Congo Rec. 937, 937 
(1933). 
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more stable markets, and to insure fair dealing in securities by 
imposing responsibilities of disclosure and fair dealing on all issu-
ers of publicly traded securities. lIB 
The agency responsible for achieving these goals through the 
administration of the securities laws is the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC).14 The Commission was established by 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as an independent agency 
consisting of five commissioners appointed by the President.1II 
These commissioners were authorized to appoint the lawyers, ac-
countants, securities analysts and other experts necessary to per-
form the functions of the SEC under the Securities Acts.IS As the 
agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the Acts, the 
Commission must insure that the investing public receives com-
prehensive information about securities issuers.17 The SEC is 
empowered to accomplish this by the Securities Acts, which au-
thorize the Commission to require securities issuers to disclose to 
investors such information as the SEC deems "necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors. "18 
I. See Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REV. 607, 625 
(1964); Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate 
Social Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REv. 248, 265 (1969) . 
•• Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1976). 
I. [d. § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (1976). 
I. [d. at § 4(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(b) (1976) . 
.. See R. SHIELDS & E. THOMAS, FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at 
13. 
I. This language appears throughout the Securities Acts. Examples include § 7 of the 
1933 Act: 
The registration statement, when relating to a security other than a security issued by 
a foreign government, or political subdivision thereof, shall contain the information, 
and be accompanied by the documents specified in Schedule A .... Any such registra-
tion statement shall contain such other information, and be accompanied by such other 
documents, as the Commission may by rules or regulations require as being nece8sary 
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
15 U.S.C. § 77g (1976). Section 10(c) of the 1933 Act states: 
(c) Any prospectus shall contain such other information as the Commission may by 
rules or regulations require as being necessary or appropriate in the public interest or 
for the protection of investors. 
15 U.S.C. § 77j(c) (1976). Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act covers proxy solicitations: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities ex-
change or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission 
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent, or 
authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered 
546 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 8:541 
This comprehensive information reaches the public through the 
prospectus, a corporate disclosure statement that issuers must 
prepare before issuing a security.211 The prospectus can not be is-
sued until a registration statement containing material informa-
tion about the issuer and its securities is in effect with the SEC.30 
The registration statement becomes effective within a specified 
period of time after it is filed with the Commission, but if the 
SEC finds the statement to be deficient for purposes of informing 
the investor, it can withhold approval and suspend the effective 
date until the statement is amended.31 The registration statement 
pursuant to section 781 [§ 12] of this title. 
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). 
I. Section 5(b) of the 1933 Act states: 
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly-
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communica-
tion in interstate commerce or of the mails to carry or transmit any prospectus 
relating to any security with respect to which a registration st&tement has been filed 
under this title, unless such prospectus meets the requirements of section 77; of this 
Title § 10; or 
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce 
any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale, unless accompa-
nied or preceded by a prospectus that meets the requirements of subsection (a) of 
section 77j of this title [§ 10]. 
15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1976). 
8. Section 5(a) of the 1933 Act states: 
(a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful for 
any person, directly or indirectly-
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in 
interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the use or medium of 
any prospectus or otherwise; or 
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce, by 
any means or instruments of transportation, any such security for the purpose of sale 
or for delivery after sale. 
15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1976) . 
• , Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h(a), 77h(b) (1976). These sections state that: 
(a) Except as hereinafter provided, the effective date of a registration statement 
shall be the twentieth day after the filing thereof or such earlier date as the Commis-
sion may determine, having due regard to the adequacy of the information respecting 
the issuer theretofore available to the public, to the facility with which the nature of 
the securities to be registered, their relationship to the capital structure of the issuer 
and the rights of holders thereof can be understood, and to the public interest and the 
protection of investors. If any amendment to any such statement is filed prior to the 
effective date of such statement, the registration statement shall be deemed to have 
been filed when such amendment was filed; except that an amendment filed with the 
consent of- the Commission, prior to the effective date of the registration statement, or 
filed pursuant to an order of the Commission, shall be treated as a part of the registra-
tion statement. 
(b) If it appears to the Commission that a registration statement is on its face in-
complete or inaccurate in any material respect, the Commission may, after notice by 
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serves as the source for all information required in the prospec-
tus. The statement contains important disclosure information 
about the nature and size of the issuer's business, the financial 
statements of the business, the management and other important 
aspects of the company. 82 
Important disclosure information also reaches the corporate 
shareholders through written proxy statements.88 A proxy is a 
document that creates a voting-agency relationship by which a 
shareholder transfers his corporate voting power to the proxy 
holder.84 Shareholder votes are important in determining who will 
compose the Board of Directors of a corporation,811 in approving 
or disapproving shareholder proposals,8s and in approving certain 
major corporate transactions.87 The SEC's rules provide that no 
proxy solicitation88 may be made unless each person solicited is 
furnished a proxy statement containing the information required 
by the Commission.89 The information required in the statement 
concerns not only the company's business, but the shareholder's 
rights within the company,40 in order to provide a fair opportu-
nity for corporate suffrage.41 
If a securities issuer does not provide the mandatory disclo-
personal service or the sending of confirmed telegraphic notice not later than ten days 
after the filing of the registration statement, and opportunity for hearing (at a time 
fixed by the Commission) within ten days after such notice by personal service or the 
sending of such telegraphic notice, issue an order prior to the effective date of registra-
tion refusing to permit such statement to become effective until it has been amended in 
accordance with such order. When such statement has been amended in accordance 
with such order the Commission shall so declare and the registration shall become ef-
fective at the time provided in subsection (a) or upon the date of such declaration, 
whichever date is the later. 
a. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j and 77aa (1976). 
aa 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976) . 
•• A. FREY, J. CHOPER, N. LEECH & C. MORRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 
427 (2d ed. 1977), [hereinafter cited as FREyj . 
•• Id. at 397 . 
•• See id. at 475-506. 
87 Shareholder votes may be necessary in approving dissolutions or liquidations. Id. at 
627-28. Shareholder votes may also be necessary to amend the articles of incorporation, or 
the by-laws of the company if so provided in the articles. 
a. Courts have held that a proxy solicitation can be any communication that is part of a 
continuous plan leading to a formal solicitation of votes. See, e.g., SEC v. Okin, 132 F. 2d 
784, 786 (2d Cir. 1943) . 
•• 17 CFR § 240.14a-3(a) (1979) . 
•• Id. at § 240.14a-l0l (1979). 
41 See SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied 332 
U.S. 847 (1948); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 13-14 (1934). 
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sures in its proxy statements or prospectuses, or if the issuer 
otherwise violates the Securities Acts, the company and those re-
sponsible for the issuance of the securities may face several sanc-
tions.42 Material misstatements in or omissions from a disclosure 
statement may lead to civil liabilities at the suit of a purchaser of 
the securities who was damaged by the misstatements or omis-
sions.4a Liability may extend to directors of the company, certain 
experts who helped prepare the statement, and even the under-
writers of the securities.44 A person who offers or sells a security 
without furnishing to the buyer a prospectus for which a registra-
tion statement is in effect may also suffer civilliability.41i In addi-
tion to these sanctions, the SEC may enjoin the issuance of secur-
ities by a company,48 and may transmit evidence of violation to 
the Attorney General for criminal proceedings.47 The Attorney 
General may impose severe criminal penalties for wilful violations 
of any provision, rule or regulation of the Acts.48 Thus, the securi-
ties laws provide strong incentive for issuers to make full and fair 
disclosures to the public. 
Full and fair disclosure is "the keystone of the entire structure 
of federal securities legislation."4. The Commission has said that 
"this emphasis on disclosure rests on two considerations. [One is 
in] seeing to it that investors and speculators have access to 
enough information to enable them to arrive at their own rational 
decisions. The other. . . rests on the belief that appropriate pub-
licity tends to deter questionable practices and to elevate stan-
dards of business conduct. "10 The effectiveness of publicity as a 
deterrent is based upon a legislatively and judicially recognized 
notion that dishonest business conduct thrives upon ignorance 
and secrecy.ll The eminent authority on securities law, Louis 
•• Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-771 (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78r, 78t (1976) . 
.. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a), 78r (1976) . 
•• Id . 
•• Id. at §§ 771, 77e, 77j . 
•• Id. at §§ 78r, 78u . 
.. Id. at 77t, 78u(d) . 
•• Criminal sanctions may be levied up to $500,000 or five years in prison, or both. Id. at 
77x,78ff. 
•• Report of special study of securities markets of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963); cited by Knauss, A Reappraisal of 
the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REv. 607, 607 (1964) . 
•• SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMM., THE WHEAT REPORT 10 (CCH) (1969). 
II See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934), reprinted in 78 Congo Rec. 
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Loss, maintained that "the disclosure requirement . in itself 
prevent[s] some [unethical practices] that can not stand the light 
of publicity."&2 Similarly, Louis Brandeis, who left the greatest 
mark on the philosophy of federal securities legislation,&8 has 
often been quoted as saying, "Sunlight is ... the best of disinfec-
tants; the electric light the most efficient policeman."&4 
The question as to just what the issuer must disclose to the 
public is at the heart of NRDC v. SEC. The Commission has 
generally required disclosure only of "material" information.55 
Under the rules of the securities acts, "material" information in-
cludes all matters "as to which an average prudent investor ought 
reasonably to be informed. "&8 In its administrative proceedings, 
the SEC has ruled that a material fact must be "of such impor-
tance that it could be expected to affect the judgment of investors 
whether to buy, sell or hold ... stock [and, if] generally known, 
... to affect materially the market price of the stock."&7 This po-
sition on materiality is consistent with the Commission's view of 
its duty as requiring disclosure of "information which is or may 
be economically significant,"&8 and is supported by the decisions 
of the courts. &9 
Recently, however, the narrow economic view of materiality has 
been challenged by some groups who would like to expand the 
notion of what is "necessary or appropriate in the public inter-
est, "80 and by some commentators who have recognized that dis-
7704-05 (1934); cited by Kerber v. Kakos, 383 F. Supp. 625, 628 (N.D. Ill. 1974) . 
•• 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION, 125 (2d ed. 1961) . 
•• ld. at 123. 
54 L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1932); quoted by 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REG-
ULATION, 123 (2d ed. 1961) . 
•• Hewitt, Developing Concepts of Materiality and Disclosure, 32 Bus. LAW. 887, 919 
(1977) . 
.. 17 CFR § 230.405(1), § 240.12b-2(j) (1979) . 
• 7 Investors Management Co., Inc., 44 SEC 633 (1971), cited in Hewitt, Developing Con-
cepts of Materiality, 32 Bus. LAW. 887, 911 (1977) . 
.. Securities Release No. 5627, 40 Fed. Reg. 51,656, 51,658 (1975). 
•• The Courts have found that the following facts can be material: failure to disclose 
that important investigations were pending by the state security commissions. Hill York 
Corp. v. American International Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 691, 696 (5th Cir. 1971); 
failure to disclose firm offers, greatly higher than the book value for the physical facilities 
of an acquired company which the acquiring company intended to liquidate as soon as 
possible. Gerstle V. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1295 (2d Cir. 1973); failure to 
disclose active negotiations to sell significant assets substantially below book value. Chris-
Craft Industries, Inc. V. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 368-69 (2d Cir. 1973). See also 
Hewitt, Developing Concepts of Materiality, 32 Bus. LAW. 887, 910-11 (1977). 
eo The Project on Corporate Responsibility, Inc. is one such group interested in ex-
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closure has great potential as a method of regulation.61 NRDC v. 
SEC involved an attempt to expand the meaning of "material" 
and "public interest" to include corporate environmental conduct. 
The legislative tool used in arguing for this expansion in the 
scope of mandatory disclosure was the National Environmental 
Policy Act. 
B. The National Environmental Policy Act 
Like the securities acts, the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA)62 endorses and thrives upon the philosophy of full disc1o-
sure,63 although the purpose of full disclosure in NEPA is some-
what different from the purpose of disclosure in the Securities 
Acts. In creating NEPA, Congress recognized the critical impor-
tance of maintaining the quality of the environment and made it 
the policy of the Federal Government to use all practicable means 
to preserve the environment.6• In order to achieve NEPA's goal, 
Congress gave the agencies a procedural "action-forcing" mandate 
in § 102 of the Act.6G This section requires that an agency propos-
panding the notion of "public interest" in securities law. They joined a separate claim in 
NRDC v. SEC, asking for corporate disclosure of data concerning minority and female 
employment. This claim was part of the litigation in the District Court cases, and in the 
Court of Appeals. See, e.g., NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1036 n.1, 1060-62 (1979) . 
• 1 See Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REV. 607, 648 
(1964); Sonde and Pitt, Utilizing the Federal Securities Laws to "Clear the Air! Clean the 
Sky! Wash the Wind!" 16 HOWARD L. J. 831, 832-35 (1971); Stevenson, The SEC and the 
New Disclosure, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 50, 60-66 (1976) . 
•• 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976) . 
• s Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d 849, 851 (8th Cir. 
1973); C{. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs., 470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 
1972) (Court holding that NEPA is more than a full disclosure law); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 
4331-4333 (1976) . 
•• NEPA § 101,42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976). See, in particular, sec. 101(a) which provides: 
(a) The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the interre-
lations of all components of the natural environment, particularly the profound influ-
ences of population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource 
exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances and recognizing further 
the critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the over-
all welfare and development of man, declares that it is the continuing policy of the 
Federal Government, in cooperation with State and local governments, and other con-
cerned public and private organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, 
including financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and pro-
mote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and na-
ture can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other re-
quirements of present and future generations of Americans. 
42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1976) . 
•• Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 
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ing to undertake major Federal action affecting the environment 
fully disclose the environmental impact of the action, and the al-
ternatives to it.66 This requirement lends itself to NEPA's funda-
mental purpose of compelling federal decisionmakers to consider 
the environmental consequences of their actions.67 
The seminal NEPA case, Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Commit-
tee Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commission,68 held that 
the "action-forcing" mandate of § 102 is not highly flexible, but 
instead establishes a strict standard of compliance for the agen-
cies to meet.69 In Calvert Cliffs', the Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC), which licensed construction and operation of atomic 
power plants, for over a year after the passage of NEP A had re-
fused to amend its rules precluding consideration of environmen-
tal issues in certain stages of its decisionmaking process.70 The 
AEC, claiming reasons of expedience, said instead that it would 
defer to environmental agencies the job of setting standards for 
operations of a plant.71 The Commission argued that full consid-
eration72 of environmental issues would delay the licensing neces-
sary for much-needed sources of power for the nation.73 The 
Court of Appeals rejected the Commission's argument and held 
that the AEC must revise its rules governing consideration of en-
vironmental issues in its proceedings.74 Therefore, under the 
court's standard, agencies may not interpose considerations of ad-
ministrative difficulty, delay or economic cost as a means of 
avoiding compliance with NEP A's procedural mandates.711 Fur-
thermore, subsequent NEP A cases have followed the Calvert 
1971) . 
•• 42 u.s.c. § 4332(2)(c) (1976) . 
• 7 Atlanta Coalition on the Transportation Crisis, Inc. v. Atlanta Regional Commission, 
599 F.2d 1333, 1344 (5th Cir. 1979); McGarity, The Courts, the Agencies and NEPA 
Threshold Issues, 55 TEx. L. REV. 801, 804 (1977) . 
•• 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) . 
•• Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 
1971). 
70 Id. at 1119-20. 
71 Id. at 1122. 
72 The court in Calvert Cliffs' said that an agency's procedures must insure "full, good 
faith consideration of environmental factors." Id. at 1115. 
73 Id. at 1127. 
74 Id. at 1129. 
7. Id. at 1115. See also Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 422-23 (2d 
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FTC, 430 F. Supp. 855, 873 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 562 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1977). 
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Cliffs' enunciation of a strict standard of compliance.76 
The great bulk of litigation under NEP A's procedural section 
has centered around an agency's duty to issue an environmental 
impact statement (EIS) when it proposes to take an action signifi-
cantly affecting the environment.77 For example, one court has re-
quired that an agency EIS for a Navy defense project assess the 
long-term ecological marine damage from dumpings of dredge 
spoils at sea.78 Another court has required that the Government 
Services Administration (GSA) assess the environmental impact 
of the location of a jail in an urban community if the impact 
would be significant.79 In elaborating on what the EIS should do, 
two circuit courts have held that the EIS should provide a basis 
for evaluating the benefits of the proposed action and its environ-
mental risks.80 
There is a scientific process of weighing the benefits of the pro-
posed action against the environmental risks, which is called cost/ 
benefit analysis.81 This analysis is complex and involves the quan-
tification of the factors, environmental and otherwise, inherent in 
agency decisionmaking.82 It is interesting to note that while agen-
cies often prepare these analyses,88 and courts have examined the 
.. See, e.g., Shiffler v. Schlesinger, 548 F.2d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 1977); Greene County Plan-
ning Bd. V. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 422-23 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); 
Environmental Defense Fund V. Corps of Eng'rs., 470 F.2d 289, 297 n.12 (8th Cir. 1972). 
,. Section 1022(C) states that: 
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the poli-
cies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and admin-
istered in accordance with the policies set forth in this Act, and (2) all agencies of the 
Federal Government shall-
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and 
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the pro-
posal be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976) . 
.. NRDC V. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1975). 7. Hanly V. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 644-46 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom, 409 U.S. 
990 (1972) . 
•• See Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs., 492 F.2d 1123, 1136 (5th Cir. 
1974); NRDC V. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1972) . 
•• Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Courts: Judicial Review Under NEPA, 9 GA. L. 
REV. 417, 420-21 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Cost-Benefit Analysis] . 
•• [d. at 420-29 . 
• s Agencies have prepared cost-benefit analyses in several cases that have reached the 
courts. See, e.g., Sierra Club V. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 820-22 (5th Cir. 1975); Sierra Club v. 
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sufficiency of the analyses,8oC there is a dearth of decisions requir-
ing an agency to conduct scientific cost/benefit analysis in prepar-
ing its impact statement.8a It may be that most agencies and 
courts tacitly believe that such analysis should be done to comply 
with NEPA.88 Otherwise, the agencies' preparation of these ex-
pensive statements is hard to understand. In any event, the EIS 
provision of NEP A requires a federal agency to consider fully the 
environmental impact of its actions in decisionmaking.87 
In its decisionmaking process, an agency must also "study, de-
velop and describe" alternatives to its actions.88 This NEPA pro-
vision is meant to assure consideration of all possible approaches 
to an agency project which would alter the environmental impact 
of the project.8e Furthermore, the duty to "study, develop and de-
scribe" alternatives to agency action is independent of the EIS 
requirement, though it has usually been applied in EIS cases.eo 
For example, in Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney,e1 the 
court held that the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1364-65 
(S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd sub nom., Montgomery v. Ellis, 354 F. Supp. 517, 521, 533 (N.D. 
Ala. 1973); Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404, 413-16 (W.D. Va. 1973), 
aff'd, 484 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1973) . 
.. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 820, 827 (5th Cir. 1975); Cost-Benefit Anal-
ysis, supra n.81, at 434-441. 
.. This is true in the case of the circuit courts, but several district courts have found 
that an EIS is insufficient without cost-benefit analysis, see Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra 
n.81, at 435 & n.138. 
.. But some district courts have held that such analysis need not be conducted by the 
agency or included in the EIS. See Cost-Benefit Analysis n.81, at 435 & n.136. If a duty to 
conduct cost-benefit analysis does exist, it should be independent of the EIS requirement, 
since the most supportive language for such a duty in NEPA appears in a separate provi-
sion from NEPA § 102(2)(C). The language of § 102 (2)(B) requires agencies to "(B) iden-
tify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the Council on Environ-
mental Quality established by subchapter II of this chapter, which will insure that 
presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate 
consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations." 42 
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1976). For support of the proposition that NEPA requires an agency 
to do cost-benefit analysis, see Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra n.81 at 442-47. 
e. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409 (1976) . 
.. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E) (1976). An agency must ... "study, develop, and describe 
appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves 
unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources." Id . 
.. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 
1971). 
10 Id. The duty is part of NEPA § 102(2)(E), which is independent of NEPA § 
102(2)(C). See Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1975); 
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
11 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1975). 
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ment, though it did not have to issue en EIS, had to consider 
alternative sites for its locations of middle and low income hous-
ing in New York.92 The purpose of considering the alternatives 
was to provide a racially, economically and ethnically integrated 
neighborhood environment.9s By its holding, the court enforced 
NEP A's strict procedural mandate to federal agencies to consider 
alternatives to their actions. 
The duty of agencies to consider alternatives to their actions is 
not absolute, however, and is subject to a "rule of reason."94 This 
rule of reason was announced in NRDC v. Morton,9" where the 
Department of the Interior had approved oil and gas leases on the 
continental shelf in Louisiana.9s The approval was made in order 
to cope with an imminent energy shortfall projected for the com-
ing years.97 In that case, the department was not required to con-
sider alternatives to the leases such as desulfurization of coal, or 
development of oil shale.9s The court said that no consideration 
was required because these alternatives were technologically un-
developed and could not realistically offer anything but long-term 
hope for new energy.99 Other courts have applied this "rule of 
reason" in holding that agencies need not consider alternatives 
having defects similar to explicitly considered alternativesloo or 
alternatives with purely speculative effects. 101 Thus, the procedu-
ral mandates of § 102 are not altogether inflexible, though they 
are strictly enforced. 
These procedural mandates are designed to advance NEP A's 
substantive policy, set forth in § 101.102 That policy declares that 
"the Federal Government [shall] use all practicable means consis-
tent with other essential considerations of national policy" to pro-
•• Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88, 92-94 (2d Cir. 1975) . 
• s [d. at 91. 
•• Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 826 (5th Cir. 1975); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 
F.2d 43, 62 (5th Cir. 1974); and NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972) . 
•• 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972) . 
•• NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
87 [d. at 837 . 
•• [d . 
•• [d. 
100 See Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 826 (5th Cir. 1975); and Iowa Citizens for 
Env'tl Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d 849, 852-53 (8th Cir. 1973). 
101 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978); 
NRDC v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 93 (2d Cir. 1975); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 62 
(5th Cir. 1974); and Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 472 (9th Cir. 1973). 
10' 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976). 
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tect and enhance the environment. l03 Congress also declared in 
this segment of the Act, "the critical importance of restoring and 
maintaining environmental quality" as a part of the policy of the 
federal government.104 The courts have not yet settled the issue of 
whether substantive review of agency decision making is available 
under Section 101.1011 Some courts have maintained that the pro-
cedures mandated by NEP A, such as EIS requirements, serve 
only to insure that the agency is environmentally informed, with 
discretion reserved in the agency to accept or reject a proposal for 
action. l06 Other courts have held that NEPA is more than an en-
vironmental full disclosure law, and that the Act was intended to 
effect substantive changes in agency decisionmaking. l07 
Although the Supreme Court has not resolved the issue, it has 
said in dicta that "NEP A does set forth significant substantive 
goals for the Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially 
procedural."108 Nonetheless, the word, "essentially", should not 
be construed as "exclusively." Some substantive compliance with 
the policies of the Act must be demanded since one of the strict 
procedural directives of NEP A is that the "regulations, and pub-
lic laws of the United States shall be interpreted and adminis-
tered in accordance with the policies set forth in [the Act]."109 
The best view, maintained by some courts, is that substantive re-
view of agency action is not available unless the agency "clearly 
gave insufficient weight to environmental values" in making its 
decision.110 This approach creates a deferential standard of review 
103 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1976). 
104 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1976). 
10. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 28.16-1 at 643 (1976); see also 
notes 104-05 infra. 
108 Cases against substantive review under NEPA § 101 include: Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 
F.2d 677, 693 (9th Cir. 1974); Bradford Township v. Illinois State Highway Toll, 463 F.2d 
537, 539 (7th Cir. 1972); National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 656 (10th Cir. 
1971); Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 340 F. Supp. 222, 225-26 (D.N.C. 1972). 
107 The following authorities favor substantive review under NEPA § 101: Environmen-
tal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hoffman, 566 F.2d 1060, 1072-73 (8th Cir. 1977); Environmental 
Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs., 470 F.2d 289, 299-300 (8th Cir. 1972); Cohen and War-
ren, Judicial Recognition of the Substantive Requirements of the National Environmen-
tal Policy of 1969, 13 B.C. IND. AND COM. 685, 692-94 (1972); Rheingold, A Primer on 
Environmental Litigation, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 113, 121 (1971). 
108 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978). 
100 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1) (1976) (emphasis added). 
110 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 
1971). See also Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoffman, 566 F.2d 1060, 1072-73 (8th Cir. 
1977); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs., 470 F.2d 289, 300 (8th Cir. 1972). 
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for agency decisionmakinglll falling far short of the strict stan-
dard of review that courts apply to an agency's procedural com-
pliance with NEP A. In order to comprehend these standards of 
court review of an agency's performance, it is necessary to have a 
basic understanding of administrative law. 
C. Administrative Law 
Judicial review of agency procedures and decision-making in 
NRDC v. SEC was affected not only by NEP A but by the body of 
administrative law surrounding the Administrative Procedure 
Actll2 (APA) as well. The APA is a comprehensive statute regu-
lating agency procedures and judicial review thereof.l18 The case 
law surrounding the AP A explains the judicial standards for re-
viewability and scope of review of agency action. 
The important agency action in NRDC v. SEC involved infor-
mal rule making. m Administrative rule making is part of the legis-
lative aspect of an agency's function.H 1i A rule is designed to im-
plement, interpret or prescribe law or policy118 and has the 
practical effect of a statute.117 An agency rule, like a legislative 
111 This standard of review is so deferential that there are few, if any, circuit cases over-
turning the agency's decisions thereunder. 
III Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 and §§ 
701-706 (1976). 
111 See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 21 (1976). The APA has had a strikingly 
unusual and somewhat inconsistent history of development in the courts. This article can 
not give a comprehensive treatment to that development. The purpose of this section of 
the article is merely to familiarize the reader with those aspects of administrative law that 
played a major role in NRDC v. SEC. Specifically, this section of the article explores the 
basic judicial tenets concerning reviewability, standard of review, and scope of review of 
agency action, and it offers a brief description of agency rules and rulemaking. The article 
necessarily does not examine the difference between formal and informal agency proce-
dures, the standards of review over formal procedures, or the precise occasions where 
courts have expanded or narrowed their scope of review. For a thorough analysis of admin-
istrative law and the history of the APA in the courts, see generally, K. DAVIS, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES (1976), and G. ROBINSON & E. GELLHORN, THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCESS (1974). 
'14 Formal rulemaking is prescribed in rare instances by statute. See e.g., the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. § 371(e)(3) (1976). It requires a hearing 
and the rules must be based on evidence in the hearing record. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b), 
556, 557 (1976). However, the case of NRDC v. SEC did not involve formal rulemaking, 
and, therefore the article does not examine that aspect of administrative law. 
110 The legislature may be said to exercise the primary legislative function, while an 
administrative agency exercises a secondary one. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 8 
(1976); 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (1976). 
118 APA, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1976). 
117 See, Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1959). 
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enactment, does not have to emerge from a public hearing or rest 
upon any recorded evidentiary foundation.1l8 Rather, an agency 
must merely show some rational basis for its decision. ll9 The 
agency may act on the basis of information in its own files, or on 
its own knowledge and expertise.120 Thus, informal rulemaking 
leaves an agency great freedom to structure its proceedings and 
decisions. 
This freedom does not, however, allow an agency to escape ju-
dicial review. The APA provides that agency actions are review-
able except where statutes preclude judicial review, or where 
agency action is committed to its discretion by law. lSI The Su-
preme Court has said that this provision creates a strong pre-
sumption of reviewability, which can only be rebutted by a clear 
showing that Congress intended to foreclose judicial review.122 
The narrow exception to the presumption of reviewability that 
has stirred the most litigation is the exception for agency action 
committed to agency discretion by law. ls3 In Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,!'· the Supreme Court said that this 
exception is a narrow one, applying only to those cases where a 
statute is so broadly drawn that there is no law to apply.l2Ci The 
Court has come under criticism for this statement, and it has 
been persuasively argued that what the Court said does not re-
present what it, or other courts, actually consider in finding 
agency action unreviewable. 126 
The best explanation of the unreviewable cases where agency 
action is committed to its discretion by law appeared in Hahn v. 
Gottlieb.127 In NRDC v. SEC, the Court of Appeals followed 
"8 See Assigned Car Cases, 274 U.S. 564, 582-83 (1927). 
110 See American Trucking Ass'n. Inc. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1953). 
II. Chrysler Corp. v. Dep't of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 669 (6th Cir. 1972). 
111 The APA prescribes when its standards of judicial review are applicable: 
(a) This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent 
that-
(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or 
(2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. 
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)-(a)(2) (1976) . 
... Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967) . 
.. 3 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976) . 
... 401 U.S. 402 (1971) . 
.. 6 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) . 
.. 0 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES at 637-45 (1976) [hereinafter cited 
as DAVIS]. 
117 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1970), Davis views Hahn v. Gottlieb as the best opinion in 
this area. See K. DAVIS, supra note 126, at 642. 
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Hahn as if it were an elaboration on the Overton Park holding.128 
The Hahn case assessed three factors in determining reviewabil-
ity: the appropriateness of the issues raised for review;129 the need 
for protection of the plaintiffs' interests; and the impact of review 
on the agency's effectiveness.130 In that case, the Court held that 
approval of public housing rents was a matter "committed to 
agency discretion by law," and therefore unreviewable. l3l 
When a court does find an agency's actions reviewable, it must 
then decide what standard of review to apply. The standard of 
review generally governs the scope with which a court examines 
the agency's action.132 The concepts of scope and standard are 
rarely distinguished,133 but a distinction deserves to be made. The 
standard of review is normally prescribed by the AP A, while the 
scope of review usually follows from that standard.134 Scope is 
flexible in both breadth and depth, and determines what a court 
will examinem and how deeply it will probe.138 
The standard of review over the SEC's rulemaking action in 
NRDC v. SEC was the "arbitrary and capricious" standard pre-
scribed by the APA.137 Under this standard, a plaintiff challeng-
ing an agency's rulemaking decision must show that an agency 
.. 8 NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1043-44 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The court's reliance on Hahn 
as an elaboration on Overton is ironic, since Hahn preceded Overton Park by a year. Com-
pare note 125 with note 127 supra . 
... See Chicago and Southern Airlines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 114 
(1948). The court refused review because the administrative decision could be based on 
secret diplomatic material. 
130 Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1249 (1st Cir. 1970). 
131 [d. at 1251. 
132 See DAVIS, supra note 126, at 657 (discussing "whether the standard of substantial 
evidence ... govern(s) scope in the absence of a (formal) hearing.") 
133 A review of administrative law treatises shows that the discussion of both scope and 
standard generally appears under scope. A careful reading of the authorities does reveal, 
however, that the two are different. Standard is spoken of in connection with the APA. 
Scope is spoken of in relation to the actual stringency of review which courts apply. See 
generally DAVIS, supra note 126; B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1976); G. ROBINSON & 
E. GELLHORN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1974). 
"4 This is not always the case, however, and DAVIS says that it is not really the rule 
anymore. DAVIS, supra note 126, at 653 (1976). 
13. Under the rule of law formulated in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943), 
the court in NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979) could have, but did not, ex-
amine the agency's view of the law as part of the judicial scope of review. 
138 The depth of the court's probe in Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967) was greater than 
the typical depth of examination by a court. See text at notes 144-148. 
137 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). 
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"had no reasonable ground for the exercise of its judgment."188 
However, the Supreme Court has held in Overton Park that judi-
cial review of an agency decision must be based on the full ad-
ministrative record in existence at the time of the decision, and if 
the record proves unable to support the decision, the agency must 
offer an explanation to justify its decision.139 If the agency fails to 
meet these tests under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the 
court may remand the case to the agency for further considera-
tion.140 The court can not, however, substitute its judgment for 
the agency's,l4l except as to matters of law.142 The arbitrary and 
capricious standard is, therefore, one of deference to the judg-
ment of the agency. 
The scope of review applied under this standard is less easily 
defined. Formulas about scope of review "can be bent in any di-
rection, in accordance with what the reviewing court deems to be 
the needs of justice or the public welfare. "148 The Supreme Court 
case of Udall v. FPC is a good example of a court applying a 
broad scope of review under the deferential "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard. 14. That case involved the licensing of a hydro-
electric power project by the Federal Power Commission 
(FPC).1411 The FPC compiled an administrative record of over 
14,000 pages to support its decision to license the project, with 
the record probing the energy needs of the region as well as the 
effect of the proposed project on the wildlife and recreational use 
of a river.148 The court remanded the decision to the FPC, hold-
ing that the agency must further explore whether delaying con-
struction of the project or preserving the river would better serve 
"the public interest," than immediate construction of the pro-
ject.147 The Court spent some time elaborating on its opinion that 
"a river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure."148 The dissent 
'8. American Trucking Ass'n., Inc. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1953). 
18. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971). 
14. The Court remanded to the agency in Overton Park, id. at 421. 
.<1 See Atlantic and Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Donovan, 274 F.2d 794, 802 n.32 (5th Cir. 
1960). DAVIS, supra note 126, at 653 . 
••• DAVIS, supra note 126, at 653 . 
••• [d. at 653. See also G. ROBINSON & E. GELLHORN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 235-
37 (1974) . 
••• Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967); DAVIS, supra note 126, at 653-54 . 
••• Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428, 430 (1967) . 
••• [d. at 441-49, 452. 
'47 [d. at 450 . 
••• [d. at 439. 
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persuasively argued that the Court had gone so far as to substi-
tute its judgement for the discretion of the FPC.149 The case illus-
trates the conclusion of Judge Carl McGowan of the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia that "judicial review can, if so 
minded, find great latitude to range widely, no matter how the 
standard of review is articulated."uo The scope of review, there-
fore, depends on whatever factors the reviewing court finds rele-
vant to the needs of justice. un 
Armed with an understanding of the reviewability and scope of 
review of agency actions, a basic understanding of NEP A, and a 
general background in securities law, one can then explore the 
controversy of NRDC v. SEC. 
III. THE HISTORY OF NRDC v. SEC 
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) (see note 4, 
supra) attempted to breathe new meaning into the duty of the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to require disclosure by 
securities issuers of information "necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest."1112 The SEC resisted the attempt, and the two 
parties struggled in the courts for several years. The confronta-
tion can best be understood by viewing it in three distinct stages. 
In the first stage, the NRDC sought to compel SEC rulemaking; 
first by petition, and then in court. In the second stage, the SEC 
conducted rulemaking and returned to the District Court for re-
view. Finally, the Court of Appeals resolved the issue in favor of 
the SEC in April of 1979,118 thus ending an eight year 
confrontation. 
A. NRDC Seeks to Change Securities Disclosures 
On June 7, 1971, NRDC filed a rulemaking petition with the 
SEcuI4 alleging that the Commission should amend its disclosure 
rules in order to implement fully its new environmental obligation 
under NEPA to "[m]ake available to ... individuals ... infor-
mation useful in restoring, maintaining, and enhancing the quali-
... [d. at 451-53 (Harlen dissenting); DAVIS, supra note 126, at 654. 
n. McGowan, Book Review, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1015, 1021-22 n.14 (1974) . 
... DAVIS, supra note 126, at 653. Davis' conclusion is that the law of scope of review is 
presently in disarray. [d. at 656. 
,., See note 28 supra. 
, •• NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
n. NRDC v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 694 (D.D.C. 1974). 
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ty of the environment."llili NRDC proposed that the SEC adopt 
new rules requiring securities issuers to disclose a wide array of 
environmental information in statements filed with the Commis-
sion. This information to be disclosed included the nature and 
extent of pollution of natural areas and resources due to business 
operations or use of business products, the feasability of and 
plans for curbing such pollution, any pending civil or government 
proceedings concerning a registrant's non-compliance with envi-
ronmental standards, and a general statement of the registrant's 
corporate environmental policies. IllS 
The SEC, in its initial response to this petition and in its sub-
sequent consideration of the proposal, maintained a steadfast po-
sition in opposition to NRDC. Before denial of the petition, when 
explaining the Commission's position, the SEC chairman stated 
that he "would have trouble justifying in [his] mind diverting our 
scarce SEC manpower from its statutory obligation to protect in-
vestors to kibitzing on the statutory obligation of other agencies 
to protect the environment."lIi7 The SEC later appeared to soften 
its position by proposing and adopting two amendments to its 
disclosure rules.lIi8 One amendment required the disclosure of the 
"material" effects of compliance with environmental laws on the 
earnings and the competitive position of a registrant; the other 
amendment called for disclosure of any administrative or judicial 
proceedings involving the company arising under environmental 
laws. I119 The new rules, however, did not represent a significant 
change in policy. Instead, the focus of the first rule was still on 
"materiality" and not on corporate pollution, and the second rule 
required disclosure of proceedings which are often financially 
"material" anyway. ISO 
to. [d. at 695. This language was quoted from NEPA § 102(2)(G), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(G) 
(1976). 
, •• The NRDC's rulemaking proposals are outlined in the Appendix to Stevenson, The 
SEC and the New Disclosure, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 50 (1976). 
161 NRDC Memorandum in support of Summary Judgment [hereinafter cited as NRDC 
Memo] at 12, NRDC v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190 (D.D.C. 1977) (quoting speech of Chair-
man Casey). 
, •• See Securities Release No. 5235, 37 Fed. Reg. 4,365 (1972); Securities Release No. 
5386, 38 Fed. Reg. 12,100-03 (1973). 
'" Securities Release No. 5386, 38 Fed. Reg. 12,100-01 (1973). 
, •• See Chrysler Corp., Form 8-K report, SEC file No. 1-686; Armco Steel, Preliminary 
Prospectus, SEC file No. 2-38312; Outdoor Sports Industries, Inc., Preliminary Prospectus, 
(Dec. 29, 1970). See generally, Sonde and Pitt, Utilizing the Federal Securities Laws to 
"Clear the Air! Clean the Sky! Wash the Wind!," 16 HOWARD L.J. 831, 870-71, 879-80 
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NRDC, unsatisfied with these minor changes in disclosure pol-
icy, sued the SEC in the Federal District Court for the District of 
Columbia.16l Seeking injunctive relief, NRDC asked the court to 
compel SEC adoption of broader changes in its rules on corporate 
environmental disclosures.16! NRDC argued that NEPA superim-
posed upon the SEC's broad rulemaking authority a congressional 
mandate to all federal agencies that gave "specific content to the 
SEC's authority under the securities laws to require disclosure of 
information 'in the public interest.' "163 NRDC contended that in 
order to comply with Congress' directive that "regulations and 
public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and adminis-
tered in accordance with the policies of NEP A"164 the SEC must 
interpret the words, "in the public interest," to the fullest extent 
possible in accordance with NEP A's mandate to protect and en-
hance the nation's environment.1611 Thus, the plaintiffs sought ma-
jor changes in corporate disclosure policy through the vehicle of 
NEPA. 
The District Court substantially accepted NRDC's conten-
tions,166 and it ordered the SEC to undertake further rulemaking 
in order to bring its disclosure regulations into "full compliance 
with the letter and spirit of NEP A. "167 The Court also told the 
Commission what it would have to do in order to justify its 
rulemaking decision on the disclosure proposals as a reasoned 
choice of discretion. The SEC, said the court, should carefully 
consider the extent of investor interest in environmental disclo-
sures,168 and should demonstrate what alternatives it considered 
in rulemaking, as well as presenting the reasons for rejecting 
those alternatives.169 The Court warned that such considerations 
might require a legislative-type hearing in order to resolve the is-
sues fully.l7O 
(1971) . 
• 8. NRDC v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974) . 
• 8. Id. at 692. 
18. NRDC v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 695 (D.D.C. 1974). This argument appeared in 
NRDC Memo at 38, NRDC v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190 (D.D.C. 1977). 
18. NRDC Memo at 35, quoting NEPA § 102(1), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1) (1976) . 
• 8. NRDC Memo Rt 35-38 . 
• 88 NRDC v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 695 (D.D.C. 1974). 
'87 Id. at 693. 
'.8 Id. at 701. 
.8. Id . 
• 70 Id. at 701-02. 
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B. The SEC Conducts a Rulemaking Proceeding 
Pursuant to the Court order, the SEC announced a public 
rule making proceeding in a Securities release on February 11, 
1975.171 The testimony in much of that proceeding concerned two 
factual issues - the extent of investor interest in environmental 
disclosures, and the costs of such disclosures to registrants. The 
true extent of investor interest in the general concept of environ-
mental disclosures could not be ascertained from the participa-
tion in the proceeding alone, since obviously fewer than all inter-
ested investors participated in the proceeding.172 Nonetheless, the 
participants who supported disclosure of environmental informa-
tion represented many organizations173 controlling or substan-
tially influencing investment assets exceeding twelve billion dol-
lars. m The actual costs of preparing environmental disclosure 
was also not clearly determined in the proceedings. Most testi-
mony came from major industries. It was their position that the 
NRDC proposal would require publicly-held companies, in effect, 
to prepare an environmental impact statement for major facili-
ties. l7ti The minimum cost estimates for preparing such studies 
were diverse, ranging from an estimated $30,000 per plant opera-
tion (Council on Economic Priorities)I76 to $300,000 per operation 
(National Association of Manufacturers).177 Obviously, therefore, 
the proceeding did not establish the specific costs or interest in 
corporate environmental disclosures. 
Many participants in the proceeding also pointed to policy rea-
sons for environmental disclosure. NRDC pointed out that the 
idea of using securities law'to aid the environment was first ad-
171 Securities Act Release No. 5569, 40 Fed. Reg. 7013 (1975). 
172 See NRDC Memo at 23, NRDC v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190 (D. D.C. 1977). 
173 Some of the organizations supporting expanded environmental disclosure were: In-
terfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility; American Baptist Church National Minis-
tries; Unitarian Universalist Association; National Council of Churches of Christ; National 
Wildlife Federation; National Audubon Society; Environmental Defense Fund; Common 
Cause; American Civil Liberties Union; Zero Population Growth; University of Penn-
sylvania Trustee Committee on Corporate Responsibility; Univ. of Notre Dame; Boston 
Univ.; Bryn Mawr; Haverford; Vassar; Stanford; Harvard; Ford Foundation; Carnegie 
Foundation; Rockefeller Family Fund; and the McIntosh Foundation. See NRDC Memo at 
18-22, NRDC v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190 (D.D.C. 1977). 
174 See NRDC Memo at 17, citing "Topical Analysis of Independent Testimony and 
Letters of Comment." 
17& See Reply Brief for SEC at 24, NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979), 
176 See NRDC Memo at 28, ~RDC v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190 (D.D.C. 1977). 
177 Reply Brief for SEC at 24, NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979), 
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vanced by the SEC General Counsel at the time of the suit, Har-
vey L. Pitt.178 Before assuming his position as General Counsel, 
he expressed the belief that the SEC "should impose affirmative 
environmental disclosure requirements [similar to those proposed 
by the NRDC] regardless of whether such disclosure is considered 
'material' in the traditional sense"179 because disclosure could 
greatly improve the environment by increasing corporate respon-
sibility.180 Pitt had supported this argument by pointing out that 
the draftsmen of the Securities Acts viewed disclosure as a 
"method of control" over corporate management.18l He also noted 
NEPA's applicability to all Federal agencies.182 His arguments 
were the main ones that the NRDC pressed in the rulemaking 
proceeding. 
After conducting this extensive proceeding, the SEC rejected 
all of the proposed disclosure rules, including one proposed by the 
Commission itself.18a In rejecting the plaintiffs' main proposal for 
comprehensive disclosure of the environmental effects of corpo-
rate activity, the SEC reasoned that existing investor interest was 
being directed more specifically at non-compliance with environ-
mental law rather than at environmental matters generally.18. In 
addition, the Commission concluded that the costs of implement-
ing the proposed disclosure rules would be overly burdensome to 
itself and to its registrants.181 The SEC also rejected a proposal 
... Sonde and Pitt, Utilizing the Federal Securities Laws to "Clear the Air! Clean the 
Sky! Wash the Wind!," 16 HOWARD L.J. 831 (1971) . 
... 1d. at 850. 
110 1d. 
II. 1d. at 843. 
lI. 1d. at 839. 
lI. The Commission's own proposal would have required disclosure of non-compliance 
with environmental laws as determined in administrative non-compliance reports. See Se-
curities Release No. 5704, 41 Fed. Reg. 21,632, 21,633-34 (1976); Securities Release No. 
5627,40 Fed. Reg. 51,656,51,663 (1975). NRDC's proposal for disclosure of corporate envi-
ronmental policy was also rejected for being too susceptible to "public relations" 
statements . 
... Securities Release No. 5627, 40 Fed. Reg. 51,656, 51,662 (1975). 
II. 1d. Impact statement analysis can be long and expensive. NRDC's broad proposal, 
however, called for an impact analysis, but of a less formal kind than is done by agencies. 
In Env'tl Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs., 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), the EIS for a 
dam project was ove! 1700 pages in length and it was done at a cost of over $250,000. 1d. 
at 294. The author examined a sample impact statement for New York State Electric and 
Gas Corporation's Cayuga Station utility plant which exceeded 11 volumes. The maze of 
technical terms, graphs and analyses in these statements is understandable only to the 
expert. For this reason, it is not reasonable to construe NRDC's proposal as calling for 
anything so extensive as a formal EIS. 
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by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ). CEQ suggested 
that the SEC require registrants to summarize and file already 
existing comprehensive environmental information used to obtain 
government environmental licenses and permits.18s The SEC ex-
pressed doubt as to whether the availability of such summaries 
would promote environmental goals,187 and asserted that the pro-
posal would require the Commission to venture into areas beyond 
its expertise.188 Another proposal for disclosure of environmental 
information solely in connection with proxy statements was not 
even considered.18e An SEC release in 1976 formally rejected all 
environmental disclosure proposals, and represented the agency's 
final action on the rule making petition. leo 
Later that year, the parties returned to District Court in a chal-
lenge to the adequacy of the rule making proceedings. leI The par-
ties largely repeated their arguments of the first court battle, al-
though NRDC expanded its arguments to attack the SEC's 
rulemaking action on procedural grounds. NRDC argued that the 
SEC did not attempt to comply with NEP A to the fullest extent 
possible because the agency did not actively seek outside advice 
on formulating rules and did not contract for any studies on the 
costs and benefits of the proposed rules. lei The SEC responded 
that it was not subject to judicial review because the Securities 
Acts vested such broad discretion in the agency that the final de-
cision under NEPA was "committed to agency discretion by 
law."les Even if subject to review the SEC continued, the results 
of informal rulemaking are "presumptively valid," so that those 
challenging such rulemaking bear a heavy burden of showing that 
the agency's action was unjust and unreasonable. Ie .. 
The Court rejected the SEC's contention that its rulemaking 
action was unreviewable, holding that the Commission's decision 
,., NRDC v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190, 1204 (D.D.C. 1977). 
,., Securities Release No. 5704, 41 Fed. Reg. 21,632, 21,634 (1976). 
, •• [d . 
... NRDC v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190, 1205 (D.D.C. 1977). 
100 Securities Release No. 5704, 41 Fed. Reg. 21,632, 21,635 (1976). 
,., NRDC v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190 (D.D.C. 1977). 
, •• Plaintiffs recommended the Commission to undertake such actions in a letter to 
Chairman Garrett dated June 4, 1975. See NRDC Memo at 55, NRDC v. SEC, 432 F. 
Supp. 1190 (D.D.C. 1977). 
... The District Court did not even consider this argument, but the Court of Appeals 
gave it serious attention. NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1043-47 (D.C. Cir. 1979) . 
... The SEC cited the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767 (1968). See 
Opening Brief of the SEC at 54, NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
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not to impose additional environmental disclosure requirements 
on its registrants was "arbitrary and capricious."lsil The Court 
cited three important reasons why the SEC's action was arbitrary 
and capricious. First, the Commission failed to consider the possi-
bility of requiring disclosure of environmental information solely 
in connection with proxy solicitations in order to provide fair op-
portunity for corporate suffrage. ISS Second, the SEC's determina-
tion that the costs of developing and implementing comprehen-
sive environmental disclosure rules were excessive was not based 
on fact.ls7 Instead, according to the court, the SEC simply made 
"bald assertions" about both the costs and benefits of disclosure 
without adequate support on the record. ISS Finally, the court 
found that the SEC had not adequately consulted with the CEQ 
to identify and develop methods of considering environmental 
values along with technical and economic factors. ISS The court 
then issued an order remanding the case to the SEC for further 
proceedings.20o 
C. The Appeals Court Renders the Final Decision 
The SEC appealed the District Court decision, and the parties 
renewed their arguments in the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia.201 Neither party added any significant dimension to 
what they had argued before the District Court. Yet the Court of 
Appeals viewed the case differently from the District Court and, 
reversing the order of the District Court, dismissed the complaint 
against the SEC.202 The Court of Appeals did not find that the 
SEC had acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The court 
reasoned that the SEC had no duty to consider the proxy alterna-
tive separately because it suffered from the same defects of cost 
and burden as did the across-the-board disclosure proposals.2oa In 
addition, the court noted, the SEC agreed to consider the merits 
of proxy disclosures in a later proceeding.204 The court also rea-
.9. NRDC v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190, 1208 (D.D.C. 1977). 
'09 Id. at 1205. . 
.97 Id. at 1206. 
'99Id . 
• 00 Id. at 1207 (citing NEPA § 102(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1976)) . 
••• NRDC v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190, 1208-09 (D.D.C. 1977) . 
••• NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979) . 
••• Id. at 1062 . 
••• Id. at 1053-55. See text at notes 234-238, infra . 
••• NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
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soned that the SEC could not be required to give factual support 
for its assessment of costs and benefits of environmental disclo-
sure because little was known about· the costs and benefits of 
traditional disclosures.2OIi Finally, the court concluded that the 
SEC did adequately consult with CEQ, and was under no obliga-
tion to adopt CEQ proposals.206 An NRDC application for rehear-
ing was denied,207 and NRDC decided not to carry the case any 
further.208 Thus, the Court of Appeals temporarily foreclosed ju-
dicial recognition of any legal responsibility for environmental 
disclosure in securities reports. 
IV. A CLOSE LOOK AT THE COURT OF ApPEALS DECISION AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS 
A close look at the Court of Appeals decision in NRDC v. SEC 
reveals a number of potentially important implications for the 
law of judicial review and for NEP A, especially as it affects the 
actions of agencies not directly involved in environmental deci-
sionmaking. In its decision the court focused on two legal issues, 
reviewability and standard of review.209 The court, however, 
treated these issues differently in assessing the agency's procedu-
ral compliance with NEP A than it did in testing the substantive 
decisionmaking of the agency. The court's review of the SEC's 
procedural compliance withNEPA was an exacting one, while its 
review of the substantive rationality of the SEC's decision not to 
adopt the proposed environmental disclosure rules was far more 
circumscribed in scope. 
A. The Agency's Procedural Compliance with NEPA 
The Court of Appeals determined that the SEC's procedural 
compliance with NEPA was reviewable and applied a strict stan-
dard of scrutiny in measuring that compliance. The only issues of 
procedural compliance facing the court, however, concerned the 
agency's duty to consult with CEQ, and the duty to consider the 
alternative of requiring environmental disclosure solely in connec-
20. Id. at 1058-59. 
208 Id. at 1057-58. 
207 Id. at 1031. 
208 Telephone conversation with David Doniger, Esq., NRDC representative in Manhat-
tan, New York (October, 1979). 
209 Standard of review includes scope of review. See text and notes at notes 132-136, 
supra. 
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tion with proxy solicitations, since these were the major defects 
that the District Court found in the SEC's procedure.210 
The Court of Appeals said that the question of the reviewabil-
ity of the SEC's compliance with NEP A's procedural commands 
presented little difficulty.21l First, it noted a congressional com-
mand in NEP A to the federal agencies, to consider alternatives to 
their actions which would reduce environmental harm.212 Second, 
the court acknowledged NEP A's command that agencies consult 
with CEQ in attempting to identify and develop new methods 
and procedures for incorporating environmental values into their 
decisionmaking.218 The court found that these clear commands, 
when added to the judicial presumption of reviewability of agency 
action, made the SEC's procedural compliance with NEPA 
reviewable.114 
In reviewing the SEC's procedural compliance with NEP A, the 
court applied the well-established strict standard of scrutinyl1l1 
founded in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. 
AEC.218 Using this standard of review, the Court of Appeals 
found that the SEC had not failed in its obligation to consult 
with CEQ. Rather, the court noted, the SEC did indeed consult 
with CEQ and gave consideration to CEQ's environmental disclo-
sure proposal before rejecting it.2l'7 The CEQ proposal, said the 
court, lacked adequate grounding in securities law because it 
sought disclosure of information having significance to groups 
other than investors.118 The proposal called for distillation and 
disclosure of existing corporate environmental data.219 Since such 
data was not of direct financial concern to investors, the proposal 
served solely to aid the environment by making the information 
public. By finding that this proposal lacked adequate grounding 
in securities law, the court accepted the SEC's position that 
"'0 The District Court also found that the SEC's determinations as to the expense of 
disclosures were "bald assertions." NRDC v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190, 1206 (D.D.C. 1977). 
The SEC's failure to study the costs of disclosures is examined more closely in text at 
notes 299-314. 
III NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
"" [d. 
III [d. at 1044, 1057 (relying on NEPA § 102(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1976». 
I .. NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
III [d. at 1048-49. 
III 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See also text and notes at notes 76-78, supra. 
"" NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1057-58 (D.C. Cir. 1979) . 
.. 8 [d. at 1058. 
lit See text at notes 184-185 supra, for thorough elaboration of the proposal. 
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NEP A did not change the narrow financial purpose of securities 
disclosures. 22o 
In addition to reviewing the SEC's procedural duty to consult 
with CEQ, the court applied its strict standard of review to the 
Commission's duty to consider alternatives to its actions.1I1 Spe-
cifically, the court scrutinized the SEC's failure to consider 
promulgating environmental disclosure rules solely in connection 
with proxy solicitations.222 Disclosure through proxy statements 
plays a different role in corporate affairs than does disclosure in 
registration statements and prospectuses. Disclosure in connec-
tion with proxy solicitation is made only to shareholders and not 
to potential investors and the general public, who can receive the 
other forms of disclosure statements. liS The shareholder, as an 
"owner" of the corporation, has a broader interest in the com-
pany's affairs than does an investor. The shareholder, for in-
stance, has the right to submit proposals for major changes in 
corporate conduct via proxy statements for consideration by other 
shareholders.1IIIII4 Considering the shareholder's broad interest in 
the conduct of the company, and considering the purpose in the 
proxy provisions of requiring fair opportunity for corporate suf-
frage, the primacy of narrow economic concerns is somewhat less 
in proxies than in disclosures designed for potential investors as a 
whole. The court acknowledged these arguments in favor of full 
consideration of the proxy disclosure alternative, and also noted 
that proxy disclosure would involve less printing and processing 
costs for registrants than across the board disclosures.1I1 None-
theless, the court held that the SEC was not obligated to give 
independent consideration to the proxy alternative in the 
••• The Appeals Court acknowledged the SEC's view of its authority as being limited to 
requiring disclosure of financial information in the narrow sense only. NRDC v. SEC, 606 
F.2d 1031, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Furthermore, the SEC stated that NEPA did not basi-
cally affect the purpose of the disclosure scheme. Securities Release No. 5627, 40 Fed. Reg. 
51,656, 51,662 (1975). The court did not challenge or object to these SEC contentions . 
... NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1979) . 
••• Id . 
••• See Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (1976) . 
••• See Proposals of Security Holders, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1979). Shareholder propos-
als, even when defeated by wide margins, have sometimes raised enough publicity to cause 
management to change its conduct. In 1971, General Motors took steps to meet many of 
the minority demands made in shareholder proposals by "Campaign GM," even though 
the proposals were all defeated. Sonde and Pitt, Utilizing the Federal Securities Laws to 
"Clean the Sky! Clear the Air! Wash the Wind!", 16 HOWARD L.J. 831, 866-67 (1971) . 
••• NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
570 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 8:541 
rulemaking proceeding.228 
The court gave three reasons to support its conclusion that the 
SEC did not have to consider disclosure proposals solely in con-
nection with proxies. First, the court said that the alternative was 
not strongly "pressed" on the agency by the NRDC in the 
rulemaking proceedings, so it was questionable whether the pro-
posal was "readily identifiable" to the SEC.227 The Court of Ap-
peals, however, did not define in its opinion its interpretation of 
"pressed." Other courts have also considered intervenors' degrees 
of participation as a factor bearing on the reasonableness of 
agency discussion of alternatives, but these cases involved slightly 
different contexts. 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that intervenors have a 
responsibility to state clear and specific contentions in a timely 
manner,228 and the Fifth Circuit has held that an impact state-
ment which failed to discuss alternatives was not deficient when 
the alternatives were not mentioned by any parties prior to the 
statement.228 These cases, however, were factually distinguishable 
from NRDC v. SEC. In the Supreme Court case of Vermont Yan-
kee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC the intervenors raised before 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) the alternative of im-
plementing energy conservation measures rather than construct-
ing a nuclear power plant.280 The Court saw this contention as too 
vague and unsupported on the record.281 In the Fifth Circuit case, 
the intervenors failed even to mention their alternative proposal 
in the proceedings, so the court determined that it could not 
reasonably find the agency's failure to consider the alternative to 
be a fatal defect.I82 By contrast, the proxy alternative raised in 
NRDC v. SEC was neither vague nor untimely raised. Rather, it 
was simply raised by a party other than NRDC and, according to 
the court, was not "pressed" on the agency. Thus, NRDC v. SEC 
expands an agency's reasonable failure to consider alternatives to 
include cases where an alternative is not, as the court put it, 
"pressed" on an agency. The court's reasoning suggests, therefore, 
••• Id. at 1054 . 
... Id . 
••• Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 534 (1978) . 
••• Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 826 (5th Cir. 1975) . 
••• Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 533, 550-51 (1978) . 
•• , Id. at 552-55 . 
• a. Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 826 (5th Cir. 1975). 
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that intervenors in future agency proceedings should try to focus 
equal attention on all of the alternatives they wish considered, 
since the agency may not have to consider lesser emphasized 
ones.288 
The court's second reason for allowing the SEC not to consider 
the proxy disclosure alternative was that the agency's duty to 
consider alternatives under NEPA was subject to a "rule of rea-
son."284 Under this rule of reason, an agency need not consider 
alternatives with defects similar or identical to those of an explic-
itly rejected alternative.28& The court concluded that the principal 
burdens of the other disclosure proposals - preparation of the 
materials by the registrant, and evaluation of their adequacy by 
the agency - would not be reduced in the alternative of proxy 
disclosure.286 Therefore, in the court's eyes, it was not reasonable 
for the agency to devote additional energy to considering the 
proxy alternative. 
This use of the rule of reason limitation on alternatives is con-
sistent with cases involving environmental impact statements, 
such as Sierra Club u. Morton. 287 In that case, the court held that 
an agency need not discuss the alternative of federal oil explora-
tion in an area leased for private exploration, since federal, rather 
than private exploration could not be shown to decrease signifi-
cantly the possibility of environmental hazards.288 The note-
worthy effect of NRDC u. SEC's use of the "rule of reason" lies in 
the court's excluding the proxy alternative because it was subject 
to defects similar to those of another proposal. The court did not 
find overriding importance in the fact that the alternative had 
... Not all courts have placed so much emphasis on the duties of intervenors to raise 
alternatives in agency proceedings. Three courts, at least, have clearly stated that the 
agency has an independent duty to "study, develop and describe" alternatives to its ac-
tions. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1975); Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs., 470 F.2d 289, 296-97 (8th Cir. 1972); Calvert 
Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Three 
courts have also noted that the agency is in a much better position to develop the record 
than intervenors are, since an agency usually has greater resources, expertise and funds 
than do intervenors. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 420 (2d Cir. 1972), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 449 
F.2d 1109, 1118-19 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 
F.2d 608, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom., 384 U.S. 941 (1966) . 
••• NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1979) . 
••• Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 826 (5th Cir. 1975) . 
•• 8 NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1979) . 
.., 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975) . 
••• Id. at 826. 
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policy considerations of broad corporate suffrage in its favor, not 
shared by the other proposals, that arguably overrode the defects. 
Where the proposed alternative may merit consideration for its 
other un shared aspects, the court's use of this approach appears 
to be contrary to NEPA's goal of ensuring that agencies fully con-
sider alternatives to an action. Nevertheless, as a result of the 
court's focus on a "similar defects" test, an agency may be able to 
reject an alternative deserving further consideration on policy 
grounds because it shares the defects of an already rejected 
proposal. 
The third reason that the Court of Appeals offered for !lot re-
quiring the SEC to consider the alternative of proxy disclosure 
was more significant. According to the court, the SEC had suc-
cessfully invoked the NEP A and administrative law principle of 
judicial deference to an agency's structuring of its proceedings.239 
Noting that the SEC had announced its decision to hold future 
public hearings to consider the role of socially significant matters 
in proxy disclosure,240 the court reasoned that, since "the agency 
. . . alone is cognizant of the many demands on it, its resources, 
and the most effective structuring and timing of [its] proceedings 
... judicial review awaits the conclusion of its proceedings."241 
Therefore, reasoned the court, it was proper to defer to the SEC's 
decision. 
The court pointed to a number of Supreme Court cases con-
cerning administrative law and NEP A to support its conclusion 
that an agency can structure the timing and methods of its pro-
ceedings. The administrative law case cited by the court, Myers v. 
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,24S involved an employer who 
sought to enjoin a National Labor Relations Board hearing 
against him on the basis that the charge was unfounded.243 The 
Supreme Court held that judicial relief for a supposed or 
threatened harm must await the agency's final decision.244 Rather 
than supporting the Court of Appeals decision though, the best 
analysis of Myers is that it illustrates constitutional "case or con-
••• NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
"·Id . 
... Id. at 1056 . 
... 303 U.S. 41 (1938) . 
... Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 43 (1938) . 
... Id. at 50-51. 
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troversy" principles.246 It is difficult to see how the case could 
stand for a broad proposition that agencies can structure the tim-
ing and methods of proceeding free of court review, especially 
where a statutory mandate like NEP A is involved. 
Similarly, none of the Supreme Court NEPA cases cited by the 
Court of Appeals supports a principle that agencies can "time" 
their compliance with NEPA. The two Supreme Court cases in-
volving the timing of compliance were influenced by other over-
riding considerations.248 In the first of these two cases, Aberdeen 
and Rockfish R.R. Co. v. SCRAP,247 the court allowed the Inter-
state Commerce Commission (ICC) to consider the environmental 
effects of a general railroad rate increase in an impact statement 
issued from a general revenue proceeding, while postponing con-
sideration of the environmental effects of an increase on individ-
ual commodities rates until future rate hearings.248 The Court 
found that the ICC had, in fact, made an environmental impact 
study on the general rate increase, and that this study was more 
than adequate. 249 The Court also acknowledged the ICC finding 
that the railroads were in an economic crisis due to sharply in-
creasing costs and losses that endangered their existence. no The 
agency was not left free to time its compliance with NEP A. 
The other Supreme Court case involving the timing of compli-
ance with NEP A was Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Riv-
ers Association.261 In this case, the Secretary of Housing and Ur-
ban Development could not possibly comply with his statutory 
duty to allow statements by a real estate developer to go into ef-
fect within thirty days of filing, and simultaneously prepare an 
••• It is a principle of Constitutional Law that a court will not render advisory opinions 
on issues that have not emerged from an adversary clash that will insure full exploration 
of the parties' conflicting interests. Under this principle, a plaintiff can not sue to prevent 
a supposed or possible harm. He must demonstrate a specific, objective harm or immediate 
threat of a specific harm in order to have standing to litigate. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1535-44, 1581-93 (9th ed. 1976). See also Baker v. 
Carr, 396 U.S. 186 (1962) . 
... The Court of Appeals mentioned two other Supreme Court NEPA cases that did not 
involve the timing of compliance with NEPA, but, instead, involved the adequacy of the 
agency's procedures for considering environmental values. These cases were: Vermont 
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); and Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 
427 U.S. 390 (1976) . 
.., 422 U.S. 289 (1975) . 
••• Aberdeen and Rockfish R.R. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289, 324-26 (1975) . 
... [d. at 326-27 . 
••• [d. at 299-300 . 
••• Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776 (1976). 
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impact statement on the developments.262 Such a statement could 
not be drafted, circulated and reviewed properly within that 
time.211S The agency, in that case, was allowed to consider environ-
mental impacts of its actions in a later rulemaking proceeding. 
Again, though, the agency was not free to time its compliance 
with NEPA. 
Furthermore, several other cases, which the Court of Appeals 
did not cite, have explicitly held that an agency can not interject 
reasons of convenience or delay to escape timely compliance with 
NEPA's procedural mandate/~6. For example, the court in Calvert 
Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC held that Congress 
did not intend the agency's timing of compliance with NEPA to 
be discretionary, even though Congress did not provide a time-
table for compliance.266 The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 
in that case, was not allowed to postpone amending its environ-
mentally deficient rules because of the agency's desire to provide 
an orderly transition in agency procedure, or because of a press-
ing national power crisis.268 
Other courts also have refused to excuse non-compliance with 
NEPA for reasons of administrative expedience. In NRDC v. Cal-
lawaY,26'1 for example, the dissent unsuccessfully argued that pre-
paring a new impact statement could unreasonably delay a vital 
defense project.268 Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit held that "delay is a concomitant of implementation of 
the procedures prescribed by NEPA,"269 and, therefore, the Fed-
eral Power Commission could not use the spectre of a power crisis 
to lighten its duty to prepare an independent and sufficient im-
pact statement before granting a license to construct high voltage 
power lines.28o Taken together these cases demand strict and 
••• [d. at 788-89 . 
••• [d. at 789 . 
... See Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 422-23 (2d Cir. 1972); Cal-
vert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971); 
Mobil Oil Corp. v. FTC, 430 F. Supp. 855, 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 
562 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1977) . 
••• Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1119-20 (D.C. 
Cir. 1971) . 
••• [d. at 1119-22 . 
... 524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975) . 
••• NRDC v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 97 (2d Cir. 1975) (dissenting opinion) . 
••• Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 422 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 849 (1972) . 
• .., [d. at 423. 
1980] ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE 575 
timely compliance with NEP A, regardless of the agency's other 
pressing concerns. 
Despite the potential breadth of its language, the Court of Ap-
peals holding in NRDC v. SEC, that it was proper to defer to the 
agency's announcement of future proceedings concerning proxy 
disclosure, should not stand for the proposition that an agency 
can structure the timing of compliance with NEP A. The court 
noted that the SEC had already conducted seven years of bona 
fide proceedings on environmental disclosure, and that the SEC 
had in the past conducted full hearings when it announced its 
intention to do SO.261 Furthermore, the court held that there was 
no obligation to consider the proxy alternative under a "rule of 
reason" anyway.262 Thus, the Commission was not allowed simply 
to excuse itself from considering the proxy alternative for reasons 
of administrative convenience. 
The result of the Court of Appeals review of the SEC's per-
formance under NEP A was a finding that the SEC did adequately 
consider alternatives to its actions, though it failed to consider a 
proxy disclosure alternative. The court also found that the SEC 
properly consulted with CEQ; though it did not accept CEQ's ad-
vice. Thus, in contrast to the District Court decision, the Court of 
Appeals held that the Commission fully complied with NEP A's 
procedural mandate. 
B. Review of the Agency's Decision Not to Adopt Rules 
The court considered the agency's decision not to adopt envi-
ronmental disclosure rules in a different light than that in which 
it measured the agency's procedural compliance with NEP A. The 
issues of reviewability and standard of review over the decision 
were more complex in this portion of the opinion. In addition, 
while, as in the procedural issue, the court ultimately found the 
agency's decision not to adopt rules reviewable, it applied a nar-
rower scope of review to that decision. 
The reviewability of the agency's decision not to adopt the pro-
posed environmental disclosure rules was treated at length in the 
court's analysis.263 The court acknowledged a presumption of re-
•• , NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1979) . 
••• [d. at 1054 . 
••• See id. at 1043-47. 
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viewability of agency action,284 and found no statute precluding 
judicial review.2811 It did, however, question whether the decision 
not to adopt rules was committed to the SEC's discretion. If the 
decision was so committed, the court said, there would be "no law 
to apply" and the decision would be unreviewable under the test 
of Overton Park. 288 
The court determined that the answer to the question whether 
the agency decision was committed to its discretion necessarily 
turned on "pragmatic considerations. "287 The court said that the 
issues posed by an agency decision not to regulate a given activity 
were largely inappropriate for judicial resolution.288 One such is-
sue mentioned by the court concerned an agency's internal man-
agement considerations, such as budget and personnel.188 The 
court cited a Supreme Court case, FPC v. Transcontinental Gas 
Pipe Line CO.,170 in support of this proposition,l71 but it is not 
clear how that case applies. The case involved an agency decision 
not to certify a gas pipe line operation,271 but the agency did not 
make the decision on the basis of internal management considera-
tions.273 Rather it decided that the operation would have unfavor-
able effects on gas conservation and gas prices.174 
The Court of Appeals may have fashioned a new test by assert-
ing that an agency's internal management considerations are rele-
vant to the issue of reviewability of a decision not to adopt a pro-
posed rule. If so, then agencies choosing not to exercise their 
regulatory powers "in the public interest" may escape judicial re-
view by demonstrating that their budget and personnel are not 
adequate to deal with a given problem. Such an approach is ques-
tionable, though, since the agency's budgetary and manpower re-
straints reflect executive and legislative matters, and should be 
... Id. at 1043 . 
••• Id . 
... Id . 
••• Id. at 1043-44. The court, at this point in its analysis, outlined the considerations 
recognized by Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1970). See text at notes 127-131, 
supra . 
••• NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1979) . 
••• Id . 
... FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961) . 
... NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1979) . 
... FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 365 U.S. I, 3,11 (1961) . 
... Id. at 6-7 . 
... Id. at 7, 23-30. 
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independent of judicial concern with interpreting the law/m Yet 
the court mentioned agency management and budget concerns as 
part of its doubts about reviewability. 
There were two considerations, however, that tipped the scale 
in favor of reviewability. First, the court recognized that at least a 
minimal scrutiny over the rationality of the agency's decision to 
reject likely disclosure alternatives was necessary in order to de-
termine if the SEC fulfilled its procedural NEP A duty to consider 
alternatives to its present course of action.27s But the court placed 
greater emphasis on a second factor favoring reviewability of the 
agency's decision not to adopt rules, and that factor did not in-
volve NEP A. The court observed that the SEC had held extensive 
rule making proceedings and had compiled a record closely fo-
cused on the proposed rules.277 The court noted that, in two pre-
vious cases involving extensive rulemaking proceedings with ad-
ministrative records focused on proposed rules, other courts had 
reviewed agency decisions. not to adopt rules.278 The Court of Ap-
peals said that judicial review of the agency's decision where the 
agency conducted extensive proceedings would not greatly inter-
fere with the agency's budget and planning, since the agency had 
already decided that considering the proposals merited some en-
ergy and time.27s The court concluded that, in light of the strong 
presumption of reviewability, the SEC decision not to adopt rules 
should be reviewable because the Commission had held a 
rule making proceeding and compiled a record for review.lSo 
The Court of Appeals decision raises some speculation about 
the reviewability of agency decisions not to adopt rules. If the 
SEC had not considered adoption of any disclosure rules, but had 
simply rejected the NRDC rulemaking petition, the Court of Ap-
peals may have found the decision not to make rules unreview-
able in the absence of a rulemaking proceeding. Such a finding 
would mean that an agency could effectively insulate its decision 
270 C{. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. 
Cir. 1971) (an agency can not interpose reasons of administrative cost or delay for failure 
to comply fully with NEP A). 
276 NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
Z77 [d. at 1047. 
27. [d. at 1046-47. The court cited Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 
(D.C. Cir. 1977); and National Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 589 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 
1978) . 
... NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
2.0 [d. at 1047. 
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not to regulate a given activity by refusing to consider rulemak-
ing. Even if the agency does consider rulemaking, but does so 
only on the basis of written comments, instead of extensive pro-
ceedings producing a record, the Court of Appeals decision sug-
gests that the agency could escape review. The court's decision 
may affect agencies whose rules are in need of amendment for 
consideration of environmental values by allowing those agencies 
to escape NEP A review if they refuse to conduct extensive 
rulemaking proceedings. Although the court did say that some 
scrutiny of the SEC decision not to adopt rules would be proper 
in order to insure that the agency fully considered alternatives to 
its action,281 the court did not indicate whether this scrutiny 
would be appropriate absent a rulemaking proceeding. Its reason-
ing suggests, however, that this substantive scrutiny of agency 
decisionmaking under NEPA may only be proper where the 
agency has conducted substantial proceedings. 
After passing on the question of reviewability, the court again 
undertook a~ extensive analysis in determining the proper stan-
dard and scope of review of the SEC's decision not to adopt rules. 
The court applied the statutorily prescribed "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard of review to the SEC's decision based on informal 
rulemaking.lISl But, the words, "arbitrary and capricious," said 
the court, did not impose a fixed template of review. lISa The 
proper scope of review under that standard· was instead, as the 
court noted, a flexible one depending on a variety of factors. lIa4 
The two most important factors that the Court of Appeals 
found relevant to determining the proper scope of review were the 
intent of Congress, and the ability of the court to evaluate the 
questions posed by the decision it was reviewing.lISli The court 
noted that the legislative history of the Securities Acts expressed 
an intent to vest the SEC with very broad discretion in regulating 
securities disclosure. lISa The court also said that many of the is-
••• Id. at 1044. 
'". Id. at 1049. See APA 5 U.S. C., § 706(2)(A) (1976) . 
••• NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1979) . 
• 1. Id. at 1050. Here, the court accurately noted the concurrence among academic com-
mentators that the scope of review was flexible. Id. at n.25. See text at notes 143-151, 
supra . 
••• NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1050-52 (D.C. Cir. 1979) . 
••• Id. at 1050-51. The court quoted S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Congo 2d Sess. 10 (1934), 
which stated that the SEC "is given complete discretion . . . to require in corporate re-
ports only such information as it deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or 
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sues in the case were not appropriate for judicial oversight be-
cause the SEC decision depended on forecasts involving its exper-
tise in securities. The SEC, remarked the court, had to assess the 
, merits of disclosures using its expert opinion on the degree of in-
vestor interest, the probable burdens of disclosures on registrants, 
and the likelihood that the disclosures would influence corporate 
behavior.187 Thus, the court saw the relevant factors as favoring a 
narrow scope of review. 
Another factor which the court found to narrow the scope of 
review was more noteworthy. The court said that the question of 
reviewability was not divorced from scope of review, and that a 
particularly narrow scope was proper where doubts existed about 
reviewability,288 as they did in the case at hand. The court cited 
two cases for its proposition, but these cases provide little support 
for the court's assertion. One of the cases involved a statute that 
expressly limited the remedies of aggrieved parties, and thus lim-
ited the scope of review.189 In the other case,290 the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia applied the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard of review, but it did not express doubts about 
reviewability. In fact, that court clearly rejected the agency's con-
tentions that decisionmaking was committed to its discretion, and 
actually over-turned the agency's decision.291 Furthermore, the 
authorities on administrative law do not link the questions of re-
viewability and scope of review.lItl Thus, the Court of Appeals in 
NRDC v. SEC fashioned a unique factor in assessing scope of re-
to protect investors." 
•• 7 NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1979) . 
••• Id . 
••• In Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 569 (1975), the Court observed that Congress 
made suit by the Secretary of Labor the exclusive post-election remedy for violation of 
union election laws . 
••• Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970) vacated 
as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972) . 
•• , Id. at 659. Medical Comm. For Human Rights v. SEC, involved a shareholder propo-
sal to Dow Chemical Co. management that the company discontinue manufacturing 
napalm. Id. at 661-63. The SEC refused to order management to include this shareholder 
proposal in the company's proxy statements, reasoning that the proposal was intended to 
promote a political cause which was outside the allowable scope of proxy function; and the 
shareholders brought suit against the SEC, alleging that the SEC acted inconsistently with 
its congressional mandate. The court noted that the purpose of the proxy provisions of the 
Securities Acts was to provide fair opportunity for corporate suffrage and remanded the 
case to the agency. Id. at 681-82 . 
••• Davis, Gelhorn and Schwartz do not recognize a link between reviewability and scope 
of review. 
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view. Under the court's analysis, a challenger to agency action 
must not only cross the threshold question of reviewability, but 
must clear that obstacle with ease in order to avoid a particularly 
narrow review. 
After stating the reasons for its narrow review, the court briefly 
articulated exactly what its scope of review would include. The 
court said that it would review the Commission's factual and pol-
icy determinations, asking only that the SEC explain the facts 
and policies on which it relied. ze3 The court might have, but did 
not, ask the agency to show some empirical basis for its determi-
nations.ze• Furthermore the court could have, but did not, scruti-
nize the agency's view of its obligation under NEP A, since the 
agency action may have been arbitrary if the agency had miscon-
ceived the law.zell Instead, though, the court only applied a very 
narrow review of the SEC's factual and policy determinations. 
Using this scope of review, the court upheld the SEC's decision 
not to adopt the proposed environmental disclosure rules. The 
court found that the SEC gave rational policy explanations for its 
refusal to adopt each of the rules. ze6 The policy considerations 
primarily relied upon were those of excessive cost and burden, 
and low investor interest. The judges deferred to the SEC's ex-
pertise in assessing the extent of investor interest in the proposal 
disclosures, ze7 and the cost of disclosure to registrants and the 
agency.Ze8 The court noted that the precise quantification of in-
vestor interest in any rule might be impossible, and that there 
was remarkably little hard data on which to estimate the costs 
and benefits of even traditional disclosures.zee Furthermore, the 
court noted, no credible effort to quantify costs or benefits was 
made by any participants in the rulemaking.30o Because of the ab-
••• NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1979). I.. One court has held that an agency must make findings of fact when the facts under-
lying the agency decision are susceptible of being found (at least, where the record had 
both formal and informal characteristics). Industrial Union Department v. Hodgson, 499 
F.2d 467, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
••• A court may remand a case to the agency if the decision of the agency is based on a 
misconception of the law, even though the agency acted within the permissible scope of its 
discretion. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943) . 
... The policy considerations relied upon by the SEC are outlined in NRDC v. SEC, 606 
F.2d 1031, 1039-41 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
117 [d. at 1039-40, 1052 . 
••• [d. at 1040, 1058-59 . 
••• [d. at 1058. 
s.o [d. at 1059. 
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sence of any data, the court deferred to the agency's stated rea-
sons and policies behind its decision not to adopt rules. Thus, the 
Commission survived challenges to its substantive decisionmaking 
as well as to its procedural duties. 
C. The Court's Decision and NEPA 
The court's decision was significant to NEPA primarily for 
what it did not do. The court did not find that the SEC had a 
duty to determine costs and benefits, the court did not require 
the Commission to articulate its NEP A responsibilities, and it did 
not offer its own view of NEP A's effect on the agency. The court's 
acceptance of the agency's failure to make a credible effort to 
quantify costs or benefits on the record is perhaps the most sig-
nificant aspect of its decision. 
The court construed the absence of cost and benefit data as a 
valid reason for the agency to rely on its extrapolative judgment, 
rather than viewing this absence as part of the agency's procedu-
ral failure to develop the record fully. By not finding an SEC pro-
cedural duty to inform itself of costs or benefits of disclosure 
rules, the court's decision contrasts with that of the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals dealing with NEP A's environmental impact 
statement provision.3Ol In NRDC v. Callaway, the court found an 
agency impact statement deficient for failure to assess long-term 
ecological marine damage from dredge dumping.8ot The court 
held that the impact statement "'must go beyond mere asser-
tions' and provide sufficient data. . . to enable a reader to evalu-
ate analysis and conclusions."808 The dissent in that case unsuc-
cessfully argued that the dearth of information concerning long-
term ecological marine damage was relevant to the adequacy of 
the agency's impact statement.80• By contrast, in NRDC v. SEC, 
the Court of Appeals saw the dearth of information about costs 
and benefits of disclosure as a factor favoring narrow review of 
SOl The scientific process of cost-benefit analysis, which involves quantification of fac-
tors in decisionmaking, is often done by agencies, but it is not clear whether or when the 
agency must do this analysis. See text and notes at notes 81-86 supra. The court decision 
in NRDC v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975), suggests that there is an agency duty to 
provide data for evaluation of factors in decisionmaking even where it will be difficult for 
the agency to obtain the data. 
801 NRDC v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 90 (2d Cir. 1975). 
808 [d. at 93. 
80' [d. at 95. 
582 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 8:541 
the agency's decision.30Ii 
The court's decision is not necessarily inconsistent with existing 
NEPA case law, however, if the court rested its opinion on the 
belief that the SEC could not make a credible effort at estimating 
the costs or benefits of disclosure. The court did not say that the 
costs or benefits could not possibly be measured, but it did say 
that there were inherent uncertainties in gathering such informa-
tion.306 Other courts have used this rationale in deferring to the 
agency's decision in NEPA cases.307 In Sierra Club v. Lynn,308 for 
example, an impact statement was held sufficient even though the 
agency asserted that certain factors in the analysis were imprecise 
and unquantifiable. S09 Another court has similarly held that 
NEP A does not demand mathematical dollar and cents weighing 
of costs and benefits, and has acknowledged that the ability to 
forecast within a complex system can become a guess at best. S10 
In that case, an agency was excused from making an in-depth 
study of the long-term effects of oil exploration on the Gulf of 
Mexico.311 It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine from 
NEP A cases when a court will demand a quantified analysis of 
costs and benefits. The answer seems to be, though, that a court 
will use its own judgment as to whether a factor in the agency's 
analysis is quantifiable.S12 In light of these cases, the decision in 
NRDC v. SEC did not add new dimensions to the law if it rested 
on the impossibility of gathering cost and benefit data. 
It is possible, however, that the case has greater significance. In 
one sentence, the court said that the stringency of review applied 
in the impact statement area may not be feasible for the other 
provisions of NEP A. SIS The court did not elaborate on this state-
ment, did not cite legal support for the idea, and did not describe 
what effect this had on its review. Possibly, the effect was that 
the court never asked the SEC to show that it even attempted 
cost/benefit analysis because the court applied a narrower review 
30' NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
306 Id. 
307 Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 825 (5th Cir. 1975); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 
F.2d 43, 61-62 (5th Cir. 1974). 
308 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974). 
309 Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 61 (5th Cir. 1974). 
310 Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 827 (5th Cir. 1975). 
311 I d. at 825. 
m This would be analagous to the law outside of NEPA. See note 277, supra. 
313 NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
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for rulemaking than it would have for impact statements. If this 
is the case, then the duty of a federal agency to study fully the 
environmental costs and benefits of its actions would be limited 
to those cases where the agency has taken "major Federal action 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."s14 
Thus, an omission of cost/benefit analysis would not be a fatal 
flaw in agency rule making with only an indirect, detrimental ef-
fect on the environment. 
The Court of Appeals declined to examine, not only the SEC's 
omission of a cost and benefit analysis, but also the agency's view 
of its responsibility under NEP A. An agency's action may not 
stand if the agency has misconceived the law, even though the 
agency acts within its permitted scope of discretion. S16 Thus, the 
Court of Appeals could have examined the Commission's view of 
NEP A as a relevant factor in reviewing the agency's actions. The 
court did not do so, however, and it also did not offer its own view 
of the Commission's authority and responsibility under NEP A. It 
is not an impossible task, nonetheless, to ascertain the views of 
the Court and the Commission concerning NEPA's effect on the 
SEC. 
While not explicitly stating its view of NEPA's effect on the 
SEC's authority and responsibility, the court did acknowledge the 
SEC's view of its authority without criticism.sl6 The Commission 
maintained that its authority was limited by the objectives of the 
Securities Acts.317 These acts, in the SEC's view, were designed to 
require disclosure of financial information in a narrow sense 
only.316 Furthermor~, the court did not take issue with the SEC's 
conclusion that NEPA did not authorize the Commission to pro-
mulgate disclosure rules solely to aid the environment.sl9 The 
SEC did not qualify this contention with any considerations of 
practicality or cost of disclosure, and so it would appear that the 
... "[M]ajor Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment" require the preparation of an environmental impact statement. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976) . 
... SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943). Furthermore, court review of agency 
findings of law is more stringent, since courts maintain primacy in interpreting questions 
of law. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 588 (1976) . 
.. 6 NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1979) . 
• 17 [d . 
.. 8 [d . 
.. 9 The Commission's view was cited by the District Court. See NRDC v. SEC, 432 F. 
Supp. 1190, 1201 (D.D.C. 1977). 
584 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 8:541 
Commission believed that it had no duty to act solely to aid the 
environment, regardless of practicability. 
The court seems to have accepted the SEC's view of its duty 
towards the environment by rejecting the CEQ disclosure propo-
sal for its inadequate grounding in securities law.s20 The CEQ 
proposal would have required disclosure of already existing envi-
ronmental data gathered in connection with a corporation's re-
ports to government agencies.321 While this proposal would have 
aided the environment by making the data public, it would not 
have served the investors' financial interests. By upholding the 
SEC's rejection of this proposal because it lacked grounding in 
securities law, and by not objecting to the SEC's contentions, the 
court implicitly accepted the Commission's conclusion that 
NEP A did not authorize it to take affirmative action to aid the 
environment wherever practicable. 
If agencies have no affirmative duty to aid the environment, 
then they should have, at least, a duty to refrain from harming 
the environment wherever practicable because NEP A mandates 
careful consideration of actions with environmental impact. 812 
This duty would be meaningless, however, to the SEC because 
the Commission's security regulation activity has no direct impact 
on the environment. The Commission does not license or regulate 
its registrants except to the extent that they deal in the selling 
and trading of securities. This regulatory role contrasts with the 
activities of agencies such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
or the Federal Power Commission, which license activities, such 
as power plants, having direct and major environmental im-
pacts.SIS If a federal agency, like the SEC, has no negative impact 
on the environment, and if it has no duty to aid the environment 
wherever feasible, what then is the meaning of NEP A to such an 
agency? 
Apparently, in NRDC v. SEC, the answer lies in a middle route 
taken by the SEC. The Commission adopted disclosures that it 
thought would aid the environment, and would serve to protect 
••• NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1979) . 
... See text at notes 185-186, supra . 
••• Even where an agency does not have to prepare an environmental impact statement, 
it must carefully consider the effects of its actions on the environment. See Trinity Episco-
pal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1975); and Calvert Cliffs' Coordinat-
ing Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971) . 
••• The direct and major impact of the: NRC's licensing activity on the environment has 
been recognized in NRDC v. U.S. NRC, 539 F.2d 824, 841 (2d Cir. 1976). 
" 
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traditional investor interests as welp24 The Commission's rule 
that a registrant must disclose material expenditures necessary to 
bring the company into compliance with environmental lawu, 
serves two purposes simultaneously. From a financial viewpoint, 
the rule provides an investor with knowledge of what a company 
must spend to avoid the potentially crippling penalties for non-
compliance with environmental standards. From an environmen-
tal standpoint, the rule provides an investor with information 
about the degree of a company's environmental problems when 
that company is threatened with non-compliance penalties. This 
result may be the most practical for partially serving ~he purposes 
of NEPA while not disrupting the agencies' traditional opera-
tions, but it falls far short of the position urged by NRDC. 
The essence of NRDC's argument was that NEP A gave explicit 
meaning to the SEC's authority to require disclosures "in the 
public interest."82e The SEC specifically rejected this argument,827 
and the Court of Appeals did not fault the Commission for its 
finding. In fact, the Court of Appeals never even discussed 
NRDC's contention that NEPA expanded the definition of "pub-
lic interest." Had the Court of Appeals accepted the NRDC con-
tention, NEPA would have had a new impact on the many federal 
agencies with mandates to assert their authority "in the public 
interest."ue But the court failed to recognize the NRDC's argu-
ment and, in so doing, quelled a potentially major influence of 
NEP A on the interpretation of statutory mandates of federal 
agencies. 
V. THE POTENTIAL OF CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE 
Although the Court of Appeals did not find that NEPA gave 
explicit meaning to the SEC's duty to require disclosure "in the 
public interest," the Court expressed no doubts about whether 
the SEC could adopt any of the environmental disclosure rules if 
••• See Securities Release No. 5386, 38 Fed. Reg. 12,100, 12,100 (1973) . 
••• ld. A registrant must report "the material effects that compliance with Federal, 
State, and local. provisions . . . relating to the protection of the environment, may have 
upon the capital expenditures, earnings and competitive position of the registrant and ita 
subsidiaries. " 
••• The District Court agreed with NRDC. See NRDC v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 695 
(D.D.C. 1974) . 
•• 7 See NRDC v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190, 1201 (D.D.C. 1977). 
... The FPC, the ICC and the FCC are but a few of the federal agencies having "public 
interest" mandates. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 42-44 (1976). 
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it chose to do so. As long as the SEC is clothed with broad au-
thority to require such disclosure as it deems "necessary or ap-
propriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors,"321 it could expand its role of providing information to the 
public. It is true that the SEC has traditionally viewed its mission 
as limited to protection of the investor's dollar interest in a com-
pany, but what is "necessary or appropriate in the public inter-
est" is potentially broader than what is necessary "for the protec-
tion of investors." The SEC could find it "in the public interest" 
to rule that some corporate environmental conduct constitutes 
"material" information to potential investors or shareholders.330 
The background of SEC enforcement actions based on viola-
tions of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act331 indicates that the 
Commission is not solidly locked into traditional notions of mate-
riality.332 While not every corporate violation of law is usually 
"material," it is evident that the SEC has come to regard illegal 
political contributions as material in and of themselves.333 Former 
SEC Commissioner, A. A. Sommer, Jr., explained that 
the Commission felt that the integrity of the nation's political 
processes . . . were so important, and should properly be important 
to investors as such, ... that ... transgressions of that law [the 
Federal Corrupt Practices Act] should be the subject matter of disclo-
sure. After all, it was the investors' money that was used in a manner 
inimical to the political processes of our country.834 
••• See note 28, supra, and text at notes 55-59, supra . 
••• Section 19 of the Securities Act of 1933, gives the SEC broad power to make rules: 
The Commission shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind 
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this sub-
chapter, including rules and regulations governing registration statements and prospec-
tuses for various classes of securities and issuers. . . . 
15 U.S.C. § 77 S(a) (1976) . 
•• , The Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1976). One of the major 
provisions of the Act limits the contributions that corporations and others can make to 
Federal political campaigns. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a et seq. 
... Note, Disclosure of Corporate Payments and Practices: Conduct Regulation 
through Federal Securities Laws, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 681, 712-21 (1977) . 
••• Id. at 713 . 
••• Id. In the 19608, speculation in real estate securities caused the SEC to broaden its 
disclosure policy. The SEC required disclosure of certain information helpful in assessing 
"the integrity of management." The Commission stated that evaluations of management 
"quality" were essential to an informed investment decision, and that the quality of man-
agement was always a material factor. This rationale has been the basis for broadening 
disclosure policy in the "corrupt payments" area. See Hewitt, Developing Concepts of Ma-
teriality and Disclosure, 32 Bus. LAW. 887, 913 (1977). Pollution of the environment by a 
company also bears relation to the "quality" of-management, but the SEC has not found a 
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The SEC could find it equally material when investors' money is 
used in a manner inimical to the environment,331 and for that rea-
son could promulgate disclosure rules making significant corpo-
rate environmental conduct material. In order for that to happen, 
though, the Commission would have to recognize that the integ-
rity of our environment is as important as the integrity of our 
political processes. 
The integrity of the environment should be "materially" impor-
tant to the investor. When he breathes polluted air, or drinks pol-
luted water, his very bodily integrity is violated.33e An individual's 
interest in preserving himself against unwarranted physical viola-
tions is one of the most basic and fundamental interests recog-
nized by the law.337 Serious corporate pollution of the environ-
ment is ultimately a violation of the investors' most basic 
interests - life and health. These violations should be "material" 
to an investor or shareholder. 
The Securities Act defines "material" information to include 
matters "as to which an average prudent investor ought reasona-
bly to be informed before purchasing the security registered. "338 
Given the investor's interest in maintaining his environment, he 
"ought reasonably to be informed" before purchasing a security 
that a company has polluted ground water wells with pesticides 
implicated in causing fertility and sterility.33e An investor "ought 
reasonably to be informed" before purchasing a security that a 
significant enough relation between pollution and management quality to require disclo-
sure of environmental information. 
a.. President Roosevelt said in his message to Congress recommending passage of the 
Securities Acts that people who manage corporations are "trustees" acting for others. See 
text at note 22, supra. When such "trustees" use the investors' money to harm their envi-
ronment, the trustees have violated the trust. Such violations, whether or not financially 
significant, should constitute "material" information to the shareholders. See text at notes 
338-341, infra. 
a.. The extent of pollution of our environment should not be underestimated. CEQ has 
reported that most municipalities do not have drinking water that meets the standards of 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Randolph and Toth, Water, Water Everywhere, 
But is it Safe?, Boston Globe, Jan. 5, 1980 at 3, col. 2. 
••• The interest in preserving one's physical integrity is at the heart of tort law on as-
sault, and is the basis of certain due process cases under the Constitution. See Fisher v. 
Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. 1967); W. PROSSER, J. WADE, & 
SCHWARTZ, Cases and Materials in Torts, 29-33 (6th ed. 1976); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
U.S. 651, 672 (1977); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 166, 174 (1952). 
a •• 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(1) (1979). 
••• Hooker Chemical Co. illegally discharged such toxic wastes from its pesticide and 
fertilizer plant at Lathrop, in San Joaquin Valley, according to the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency. CHEMICAL ENGINEERING, Dec. 31, 1979, at 19. 
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company has not safely disposed of over one million tons of 
chemical process wastes.a40 An investor "ought reasonably to be 
informed" that a company has dumped over 67,000 tons of asbes-
tos tailings into a fresh water lake. au Such corporate pollution 
should constitute "material" information to the investor because 
"he ought reasonably to be informed" of corporate activities 
which threaten his environment, and ultimately his very health. an 
Some of these harms to the environment may be the subject of 
"material" disclosure within the existing meaning of the term, but 
the term still has a predominantly financial focus. In March of 
1977, the SEC filed a complaint against Allied Chemical Co. for 
failing to disclose that it was subject to material, potential 
financial exposure resulting from its discharge of toxic chemicals 
into the James River in Virginia.a4a While such an enforcement 
action would appear to put companies on notice that they have to 
disclose much of their environmentally destructive activity, this is 
not so. The focus of "materiality" is still financial, and so a corpo-
ration can not be faulted for disclosing only the nebulous 
financial impacts to itself of its pollution. au For purposes of pro-
tecting the investors' dollars, it should be adequate for a corpora-
tion merely to state that it is subject to a certain, potential 
amount of liability for violating pollution laws. It is certainly in-
conceivable that a chemical company, for example, would have to 
describe in detail the volume and the kind of chemicals it was 
dumping, the location of the dumping, or the likely effects on the 
regional populace. Furthermore, much of a company's pollution 
does not have to be reported at all, since it does not often have 
"material" consequences to the company. This is because, as the 
••• Sixty-six million tons of chemical waste were generated by the fifty-three largest 
chemical manufacturers in 1978 alone. That equals almost 1.25 million tons per company. 
Unfortunately, a House Subcommittee has concluded that many of the disposal facilities 
for such wastes would be illegal under hazardous waste regulations of the EPA. CHEMICAL 
ENGINEERING, Dec. 13, 1979, at 16 . 
.. , In Duluth, Minnesota, residents must drink bottled water because of the waste 
dumped into Lake Superior by the Reserve Mining Co .. Randloph and Toth, Water, 
Water Everywhere, But is it Safe?, Boston Globe, Jan. 5, 1980, at 3, col. 2 . 
... The investor might also like to know when a company's industrial emissions contrib-
ute to the problem of "acid rain." Seven hundred United States and Canadian scientists 
gathered in Toronto in November of 1979 to discuss the acid rain problem. It is particu-
larly acute in Canada, where 48,000 lakes are threatened with oxygen death. Dumanoski, 
Acid Rain Knows No National Borders, Boston Globe, Nov. 19, 1979, at I, col. 1. 
... See NRDC v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190, 1196 n.12 (D.D.C. 1977). 
••• See text at notes 59-60, supra. 
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SEC observed, environmental laws do not exist concerning many 
forms of pollution.3411 In addition to these shortcomings of "mate-
riality," corporate failure to disclose material pollution has been a 
largely barren field for SEC enforcement actions.346 Thus, the 
traditional notion of "materiality" has provided an inadequate 
means of informing an investor of significant harm to his 
environment. 
If the SEC were to promulgate rules incorporating significant 
corporate pollution within the notion of "materiality," not only 
would the investor gain a greater awareness of the consequences 
of his investment, but our environment could be helped as well. 
The SEC, the Congress and many commentators have recognized 
the usefulness of disclosure as a regulatory tool. The Commission 
has repeatedly said that disclosure publicity deters questionable 
practices and elevates standards of business conduct;347 commen-
tators such as Brandeis and Loss have endorsed disclosure as a 
salutary measure;348 and Congress has made disclosure the back-
bone of much of its regulatory legislation, such as the Freedom of 
Information Act,34' the Truth in Lending Act,3IIO the Interstate 
Land Sales Full Disclosure Act,311l and the Consumer Credit Pro-
tection Act. m While no one has proven or quantified the effect of 
disclosure as a cure for social ills, there has long been a strong 
undercurrent in American political thought that the free flow of 
information is vital to a strong society. 
The possible requirements of a disclosure rule can not fully be 
explored within this article, but such a solution might call for dis-
closure of illegal environmental activities such as chemical dump-
a •• Securities Release No. 5704, 41 Fed. Reg. 21,632, 21,633 (1976) . 
•• e For the years, 1976-1979, the Federal Securities Law Reporters (CCH), reveal no 
SEC actions against companies for failure to report "material" environmental pollution. It 
will be interesting to see if the SEC proceeds against Hooker Chemical Co. concerning 
disclosure of Hooker's chemical waste dumping at Love Canal, New York. The United 
States Department of Justice instituted a $124 million suit against the company in late 
1979. . . . See CHEMICAL ENGINEERING, Dec. 31, 1979, at 19. The question the SEC will 
have to ask is, "Should Hooker Chemical have disclosed its waste dumping activities 
before the law suit, and if so, did the company make such a disclosure?" 
... See text at note 49, supra. See also Stevenson, The SEC and the New Disclosure, 62 
CORNELL L. REV. 50, 61 (1976) . 
••• See text at notes 52-53, supra . 
••• 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). 
, •• 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1976). 
'Ol 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1976) . 
••• Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 302-05, 307, 401-15, 503, 88 Stat. 1511 (1974) (codified in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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ing and oil spills.353 It also might call for distillation of existing 
environmental pollution data,3!!4 to be accompanied by a stan-
dardized addendum explaining the known adverse effects of an 
operation's products or pollutants on human health and the envi-
ronment.m In addition, it could indicate whether the operations' 
pollutants are de minimus, or in major violation of environmental 
standards. It is possible that none of these options would be feasi-
ble, but it is difficult to believe that some kind of workable and 
environmentally beneficial disclosure standards could not be cre-
ated. The Commission can not take the Janus-like position that 
disclosure deters unethical business dealing, but would not influ-
ence corporate environmental conduct. The question that remains 
is whether the SEC can and will make creative use of its potential 
to influence the environmental practices of business. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Almost a decade ago, The Natural Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC) sought to expand the meaning of disclosure "in the pub-
lic interest" in securities law through the vehicle of NEP A. The 
SEC rejected NRDC's contention that corporate environmental 
conduct had a place in the disclosure scheme, and obtained a final 
victory over NRDC in the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia in April of 1979. 
The Court of Appeals decision not only quashed an immediate 
expansion of the SEC's role in providing information to the in-
vesting public, but also made imprints on the developing law of 
NEPA. In examining the SEC's duty to consider alternatives to 
its action under NEP A, the court has suggested that agencies are 
somehow free to time their compliance with NEP A. The court's 
language could give agencies much greater freedom in dealing 
••• NRDC's proposed rules would have covered both legal and illegal pollution, but 
NRDC did not propose disclosure of illegal pollution activity only. The SEC rejected its 
own proposal that companies file a list of environmental agency compliance reports indi-
cating non-compliance. Securities Release No. 5704, 41 Fed. Reg. 21,632, 21,633-34 (1976). 
Such reports, however, would not include secret illegal activities, such as chemical dump-
ing, unless those activities were reported to the environ~ental agency monitoring non-
compliance . 
••• This is the CEQ proposal. See text at notes 185-186, supra . 
••• This proposal would avoid precise quantification of pollutants and their effects, 
which constitutes much of the expense of cost-benefit analysis. The "potential" adverse 
effects of various classes of pollutants are well known. See R. JAIN, L. URBAN & G. STACEY, 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ANALYSIS, 168-316 (1977). 
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with NEP A, but the decision should be read in light of other 
facts. The court itself noted that the SEC had conducted timely 
and extensive proceedings to meet its NEP A obligations, and 
would continue to do so. Furthermore, the decisions of other 
courts would not support a proposition that agencies can time 
their compliance with NEP A. 
The decision of the court in NRDC u. SEC may affect NEPA in 
other ways as well. What the court did not say is as important as 
what it did say. The court tacitly accepted the SEC's contention 
that NEP A did not give explicit meaning to its "public interest" 
mandate. The decision implies that the many agencies with "pub-
lic interest" mandates do not have new duties of environmental 
consideration, despite NEP A's mandate that the laws of the 
United States shall be interpreted in accordance with its policy. 
The court also did not elaborate on NEPA's effect on securities 
disclosure, but it appears that the court accepted the SEC's inter-
pretation that NEP A required disclosure only of information that 
would protect the investor's dollars as well as his environment. 
This means that NEPA has little or no effect on non-environmen-
tal agencies that have no negative impact on the environment, 
even though NEP A was meant to affect all Federal agencies. 
What NEP A offered the Commission was an imaginative means 
of using its authority in a socially valuable way. The SEC de-
clined to accept the opportunity. What remains to be seen is 
whether, and to what extent, the SEC will find it "material" that 
corporate managers are using an investor's money to destroy his 
environment. For at least the time being, the answer is that an 
investor has no right to know how other people are using his dol-
lars to degrade his environment. 
